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Abstract
Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences
Department of Economics
Essays on Financial Inclusion, Food Security and Nutrition in Developing
Countries
by Hamidou JAWARA
This dissertation is focused on two main issues that continue to attract huge atten-
tion in the development economics discourse: Food security and nutrition and finan-
cial inclusion. These two issues are studied in three chapters. Thus, food security
and nutrition is covered in chapter one and financial inclusion is covered in chapter
two and three.
In looking at food security and nutrition, the study here is concentrated on the
elasticity of nutrient intake to changes in wealth. The study of the relationship be-
tween nutrient intake and wealth for poor households continue to be an issue of
huge policy relevance. Therefore, we contribute to the ongoing debates on the nutri-
ent income elasticity using a sample of ultra-poor (i.e. with orphans and vulnerable
children-OVC) households in Kenya. To estimate nutrient income elasticity for these
households, we used data for the evaluation of the Kenya Cash Transfer OVC project
and panel data techniques that address measurement error and simultaneity bias. In
addition, we also used semi-parametric panel data models to address nonlinearities.
For majority of the nutrients considered in our study, we find that they have an in-
come elasticity that is inelastic and significantly different from zero. Furthermore,
we also find that caloric intakes are more inelastic to changes in wealth than macro
and micro nutrient intakes. Overall, the results support the evidence that dietary be-
havior does response to changes in wellbeing. Therefore, development policies that
target wellbeing can also promote better nutritional outcomes and food security in
ultra-poor households.
Despite the gains being mixed, financial inclusion is still heralded as an essential
tool in the fight against global poverty; in particular, for the achievement of the 2030
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agenda. This is rationalized by the fact that still lot of people, particularly in devel-
oping countries, lack access to basic financial services. Lack of access to financial
services entrenches poverty because it makes consumption smoothing more diffi-
cult. It is for this reason, supported by empirical evidence, that it is a widely held
belief that access to finance can stimulate a positive change in welfare. Hence, in this
dissertation I used individual and household survey data from Gambia to study two
aspects of financial inclusion: First, I study the impact of access to formal financial
services like basic saving on household outcomes such as total spending, ownership
of durable assets, health spending, and education spending. Using a representative
household survey and kernel ridge regression method, I find that household access
to formal means of savings has a positive and statistically significant impact on all
the outcomes of interest except health spending. Furthermore, I find the largest effect
size of 73% for education expenditure. However, the impact estimates on education
and food expenditure are not very robust to mild presence of hidden bias. Hence,
overall I find robust impact for total expenditure and asset ownership. Second, I
study whether personality traits can affect repayment behavior of a borrower in a
joint liability lending scheme. To this effect, I use a big five inventory consisting of
30 items to measure non-cognitive traits. The 30 items are then grouped into five
main sub-groups commonly known as the Big Five Inventory in Psychology. A bor-
rower rate herself on each of the items and the standardized score of a borrower in
each element of the subgroups is determined and this is related to the probability of
the borrower to default on her part of a group loan. Using data from an NGO-based
microcredit program in Gambia, I find that personality traits such as Extraversion,
Agreeableness, Neuroticism, and Openness to Experience matters for the likelihood
of default. In particular, an increase in the amount of these traits is associated with
lower probability of default. Hence, the evidence I find is an indication that asym-
metric information problems (in particular adverse selection problems) are real in
microcredit markets; at least true for the context studied. Therefore, the inclusion
of personality trait instruments among the screening devices used by micro-lenders
could enhance the performance of these schemes. This is quite useful for develop-
ing countries as screening of borrowers is difficult due to lack of data on financial
history.
iii
Note that the the first chapter is a joint work with Rainer Thiele and the other
two chapters are individual works.
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1Chapter 1
Nutrient Income Elasticity in
Ultra-Poor Households: Evidence
from Kenya
1.1 Introduction
Motivated by the assertion that hunger and poverty tend to be synonymous (Baner-
jee and Duflo, 2011), i.e. the prevalence of hunger and malnutrition is associated
with poor economic status, a significant amount of mostly empirical literature on the
relationship between nutritional status and income or total expenditure has emerged
over the last decades (Ogundari and Abdulai, 2013).
Theoretically, two explanations can be given on why nutrition might be related
to income or expenditure. The first is the efficiency-wage hypothesis (Leibenstein,
1957; Mirrlees, 1957; Stiglitz, 1976), according to which employers reward labour
based on productivity and the latter is determined by nutritional status. Thus, un-
employment and therefore poverty exists because some people do not have enough
to eat (Subramanian and Deaton, 1996). The second explanation, which has domi-
nated much of the academic literature, is that nutrition status is determined by in-
come and food demand (Subramanian and Deaton, 1996). Accordingly, nutritional
problems such as malnutrition, which is assumed to be associated with underdevel-
opment, would be attenuated by economic prosperity (Abdulai and Aubert, 2004).
This latter argument has motivated a long-standing debate on whether what Sub-
ramanian and Deaton (1996) called a "calorie Engel curve" exist or not for the poor.
A calorie Engel curve would imply that the poor switch from poor quality food but
less expensive calories to more expensive calories but high-quality food as income
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increases (Skoufias et al., 2011). Therefore, the primary behavioural parameter of
interest in these debates is the calorie-income elasticity (Gibson and Rozelle, 2002).
Some empirical studies have estimated the calorie-income elasticity, but the ev-
idence is still mixed (Santeramo and Shabnam, 2015). In particular, while some au-
thors (such as Behrman and Deolalikar, 1987; Bouis and Haddad, 1992; Skoufias
et al., 2009) find that the responsiveness of calories to income changes is not signifi-
cantly different from zero, others (e.g Subramanian and Deaton, 1996; Abdulai and
Aubert, 2004; Aromolaran, 2004; Skoufias et al., 2011) obtain a positive and statisti-
cally significant calorie-income elasticity. This has important policy implications: If
it is true that nutrient intake does not respond to changes in income, then, common
interventions such as cash transfer programs will not suffice to eliminate malnutri-
tion and food insecurity.
Against this background, the objective of this study is to provide new evidence
on the nutrient-income elasticity in a setting of impoverished households in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Most of the evidence so far is from Asian and Latin American coun-
tries and does not cover the very poorest households. By contrast, we consider ultra-
poor households, i.e. households with orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs), in
Kenya. The size of this group is non-negligible: It is estimated that there about
2.6 million OVCs in Kenya and 12% of all households have at least one OVC (Lee
et al., 2014). Lee et al. (2014) estimate that more than half of OVC households are in
the lowest two quintiles of the wealth distribution in Kenya and 22% of them have
experienced moderate to severe food shortages. Studying whether income gains
may help impoverished households in Kenya improve their nutritional status is thus
highly policy-relevant, especially at a time when social programs to tackle food and
nutrition problems are ubiquitous in the country.
Another notable feature of our study is that besides calorie elasticities it also
provides evidence on the elasticity of other (macro and micro) nutrient intakes to
changes in income. Most of the debates on the relationship between dietary be-
haviour and changes in income have focused on caloric intake, but calories are not
the only important component of human diets. As highlighted by Skoufias et al.
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(2009), a positive relationship between energy intake and income does not necessar-
ily translate into a significant positive relationship between nutrient intake and in-
come and vice versa. Households may, for example, use additional income to switch
to more nutrient-rich foods with the same calorie content. It is therefore essential to
also investigate the impact of income on the intake of macro and micronutrients.
The macronutrients we study are protein, fat, and fibre and the micronutrients are
vitamins (A, D, and Folate) and minerals (zinc, iron, and calcium). There is evidence
that higher intake of these nutrients is associated with better health via a reduc-
tion in malnutrition and other nutrient-deficiency-related health problems such as
anaemia.
Furthermore, we contribute to the methodological debate on the issue of non-
linearities that arise if nutrition elasticities differ between income groups. In par-
ticular, the calorie-income elasticity may be higher for poorer household, who have
insufficient food to eat, than for richer households. This issue was first raised by
Strauss and Thomas (1990) who found for the case of Brazil that indeed the calorie-
expenditure elasticity is higher for poorer households. They concluded that this
non-linearity could not be adequately captured in a fully linear parametric model.
Following their land mark study, the use of complete nonparametric techniques to
estimate calorie-income elasticity grew in popularity (e.g. Subramanian and Deaton,
1996; Skoufias, 2002; Abdulai and Aubert, 2004; Skoufias et al., 2011). Complete non-
parametric models are desirable because they allow for curvature without imposing
any functional form on the data (DiNardo and Tobias, 2001). However, they pose a
major drawback in that they prevent the inclusion of a large set of control variables;
particularly, variables that are known to follow a particular parametric form. Hence,
partial-linear models that allow for the inclusion of variables in both parametric and
nonparametric fashion can be considered as good comprises between fully paramet-
ric and nonparametric models (Rodriguez-Poo and Soberon, 2017). In our case, this
is desirable because it allows for a flexible characterisation of the nature of the re-
lationship between wealth and nutrients intake while at the same time allowing for
other covariates to be controlled for in a parametric fashion. For this reason, we
employ the partial-linear panel data model suggested by Baltagi and Li (2002) to
control for possible nonlinearities in the relationship between nutrient intakes and
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wealth. To the best of our knowledge, Tian and Yu (2015) study on China is the only
previous study that used this approach.
In addition to dealing with non-linearity, we also address the problems of mea-
surement error and simultaneity bias. Meta-Analyses by Ogundari and Abdulai
(2013), Santeramo and Shabnam (2015), and recently by Colen et al. (2018) have
pointed to differences in dealing with these methodological flaws as critical factors
behind the heterogeneity in estimated nutrient-income elasticities. We use the ap-
proach developed by Lewbel (2012), recently extended to panel data by Meijer et al.
(2017) to address the measurement error problem, and standard panel IV estimation
to tackle the problem of simultaneity bias and measurement error. Given that the
Meijer et al. (2017) approach is valid under the assumption that model suffers just
from measurement error bias, the instrument generated via this procedure might
not be consistent. We check for this by estimating the main model of interest with
both the standard instrument and generated instruments used as instruments. Re-
sults indicate that the instrument generated via Meijer et al. (2017) generally tend to
over-correct for the OLS bias.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In section 1.2, we dis-
cuss the data used in the empirical analysis and provide some descriptive statistics.
Section 1.3 introduces the estimation methodology, while Section 1.4 discusses the
results. Section 1.5 summarizes the main findings and concludes.
1.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data we use were collected for the evaluation of the Kenya cash transfer pro-
gram for orphans and vulnerable children (Kenya CT-OVC in short). The Kenya
CT-OVC is a safety net program run by the government with the primary objective
of offering social protection to ultra-poor households, i.e. households with orphans
and vulnerable children. It takes the form of a regular monthly income transfer of
initially Ksh 1500 (about 20) per household, which has been increased over time to
capture price changes. An OVC household is defined as a household that satisfies
one of three criteria: there exists at least one single or double orphan; the primary
caregiver is chronically ill, or the head is chronically ill (Handa et al., 2016). OVC
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status plus other variables such as age of the main caregiver, education level, asset
ownership, access to clean water and sanitation were the leading indicators used in
the program targeting (See Handa et al., 2012, for details).
The government of Kenya and UNICEF piloted the program in 2004 and since
then has reached over 350,000 beneficiaries. Followings its success in the piloting
phase, it was adopted into the national budget in 2007 as a government flagship
social protection program, and consequently, there was an agreement for it to be
expanded to other regions of the country. Before this expansion was effected, an
evaluation of the program was commissioned by UNICEF and contracted to a pri-
vate consulting firm, the (OPM) Oxford Policy Management (The Kenya CT-OVC
Evaluation Team, 2012). The evaluation was carried out in seven districts. Three
rounds of surveys were carried out between 2007 and 2011: a baseline survey in
2007 and two follow-up surveys in 2009 and 2011. The number of eligible house-
holds surveyed in the baseline was 2,294, and there was, respectively, a 17% and 5%
attrition between baseline and first follow-up in 2009 and between first follow-up
and second follow-up in 2011 (Handa et al., 2016).
Since one of the objectives of the program was to improve food security in OVC
households, information on household food consumption was collected alongside
other household indicators on health, education, and children welfare. In this study,
we use data on household characteristics, village-level characteristics, and food con-
sumption to study the calorie or nutrient income elasticity for households. Specif-
ically, we use age of the household head, gender of the household head, education
level of the household (measured as the number of adults in a household with at
most 8 years of education), household size, household total expenditure (measured
as the sum of food and nonfood expenditure), and different household demographic
ratios (such as proportion of children under 5, under 14, under 16, proportion of
adults, and proportion of old people) as indicators of household characteristics. Dis-
tance to the nearest market and access to a road network serve as village level char-
acteristics.
In collecting the food consumption data, households were requested to make a
recall of 29 food items that they consumed in the last seven days before the day of
their interview. For each food item, information on total outlays, the main source, as
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well as the quantity and unit consumed, were collected. Also, local market prices of
19 food items were collected using a questionnaire that was administered at the com-
munity level. We use this information to construct food availability in a household
from which per-capita caloric and nutrient intake from 13 food items (maize flour,
Irish potato, beans, bananas, kale, beef with bones, dried fish, eggs, milk, cooking
oil, sugar, salt, and tea leaves) consumed by the household is computed. In doing
so, we first divide household monthly total expenditure on each food item by the
minimum locality price per unit (kilogram or litres) of that food item, where min-
imum prices are computed from the report of local prices at the community level.
This allows us to obtain quantities of the different food items consumed by each
household.1 We considered food from all sources (purchased, own production, and
received as gifts); food from own production and received as gifts were valued at
the prevailing local market price. Since the information available is not enough to
compute actual consumption of food by each household as wastage and leftovers or
food to guest and worker are not accounted for, we only capture food availability,
which could result in an overestimation of our calorie- or nutrient-wealth elastici-
ties. Second, we convert the unit of measurement of each food item from kilogram
and litres to grams and millilitres. Third, to derive total calorie or nutrient intakes
from a food item, we multiply the total number of grams or millilitres of household
consumption of that food item by the number of kilocalories or nutrient available
in a 100 grams edible portion. We use the food composition table of Tanzania by
Lukmanji et al. (2008) for the conversions in this step. The total caloric or nutrient
intake from a food item can then be summarised as
C =∑
i
qici (1.1)
where qi is the total number of grams or milliliters of food i(i = 1, 2, 3, ..., 13)
consumed by a household and ci ) is the calorie or nutrient equivalent unit of food
item i . Finally, we compute per-capita calorie or nutrient intake by dividing total
caloric or nutrient intake (given as Cj) of each household by the adult equivalent
1 Even though some of the questionnaires collected information on the exact quantities that were
consumed and the units involved, this information was not collected in all survey rounds. Thus, for
the sake of consistency, we rely on the above procedure to derive quantities consumed.
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unit of that household using the adult equivalent scales from Anzagi and Bernard
(1977). For the analysis below, we categorise the food items into food groups. The
total number of calories from a food group is given as the sum of per-capita calories
or nutrients from all the items in that food group, i.e. for food group g with j food
items we obtain
Cg =∑
j
Cj (1.2)
In our case, we define nine food groups: cereal, tuber, pulse, fruit, vegetable,
meat, milk, oil, and sugar. To minimise the effect of outliers, we winsorize the val-
ues of all the measures computed here at their 2nd and 98thpercentile; that is all
values below and above the 2nd and 98th percentile, respectively, are set to these per-
centiles. Given that the design of the evaluation was longitudinal, the data collected
for the three periods can be used to construct a panel dataset on households’ food
consumption. To ensure we are dealing with a balanced panel, we focus on house-
holds that were surveyed in all three rounds; households surveyed in the baseline
but not surveyed in the follow-ups are dropped from the analysis. Pooled over the
three rounds, this gives a total of 5346 observations. Note that the evaluation of the
program targeted only poor rural households. Our sample is therefore not repre-
sentative of all households in Kenya but represents only those with characteristics
similar to the targeted group.
Table 1.1 reports summary statistics for the household and village-level charac-
teristics. Each statistic is shown for OVC households in the bottom and top quartile
of the wealth distribution (given in terms of per-capita household total expenditure),
as well as for all the OVC households in the sample and each period. It can be seen
that the average age of OVC household heads is about 61 years in the baseline (2007)
and a bit lower in the subsequent years. As expected, poorer OVC households are
much bigger than richer OVC households. However, in terms of the composition
of the different age groups in the households, the two samples do not differ signif-
icantly. Household per-capita expenditures increase over time for all households.
In the overall sample, there was a rise of about 75% and 25%, respectively, in 2009
and 2011, which may at least partly be due to the positive income shock created
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TABLE 1.1: Household and Village Indicators
Bottom 25 % Top 25 % Pooled
Year 2007 2009 2011 2007 2009 2011 2007 2009 2011
Age (Head) 61.42 56.99 59.43 57.28 58.50 60.06 61.33 57.58 58.00
Female (Head) 0.62 0.59 0.56 0.67 0.70 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.63
Education (Head) 1.22 1.45 1.74 0.65 0.70 1.09 1.11 1.12 1.28
household size 6.17 7.43 7.76 3.99 4.34 4.66 5.62 5.70 5.73
Expenditure (Ksh, 000) 2.73 3.17 3.17 11.45 13.18 14.67 4.50 7.89 9.92
ChildU6 (proportion) 0.13 0.13 0.089 0.13 0.10 0.071 0.13 0.11 0.08
ChildU14 (proportion) 0.28 0.22 0.27 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.27
ChildU18 (proportion) 0.20 0.03 0.20 0.11 0.04 0.18 0.19 0.04 0.19
Adult (proportion) 0.14 0.31 0.28 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.25
Old (proportion) 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.15 0.17
Market (minutes) 41.95 34.41 38.30 39.75 30.75 42.57 43.41 32.12 39.35
Road (proportion) 0.72 0.95 0.76 0.80 0.91 0.76 0.72 0.92 0.76
Price of calorie (Ksh, 00) 1.86 2.23 4.24 2.09 2.86 4.78 1.90 2.59 4.55
Descriptive statistics of household and village level covariates. Bottom 25 % = Households
with per capita expenditure in the bottom quartile of the wealth distribution; Top 25 % =
Households with per capita expenditure in the top quartile of the wealth distribution; Pooled
= All households in the sample. Reported are the means of each covariate in each sub-sample
as well as in the overall sample by year. Note that all the continuous variables were win-
sorized at 2%; this was done in order to dampened the effect of outliers on the estimation of
the means.
by the cash transfer. Increases are more pronounced for richer than poorer OVC
households; between 2009 and 2011, the poor OVC households did not experience
any rise in per-capita expenditure. Education levels also improve over time for both
poor and rich OVC households as well as in the overall sample. Interestingly, poorer
OVC households tend to perform better on education than richer OVC households;
this happens even at baseline so could not be due to the cash transfer. Price of calo-
rie, given as the ratio of total expenditure to total calories of all food items, is used
to measure food quality in the two groups. In general, food quality improves over
time for all households, but OVC households in the top quartile invest more in qual-
ity food than those in the bottom quartile. The village-level characteristics (distance
to a market and access to a road) do not differ significantly across the two groups of
households.
Summary statistics on nutrient intakes are given in Table 1.2. Average per-capita
energy intake by OVC households in the bottom quartile is generally much lower
Chapter 1. Nutrient Income Elasticity in Ultra-Poor Households: Evidence from
Kenya
9
TABLE 1.2: Macro and Micro Nutrients
Bottom 25 % Top 25 % Pooled
Year 2007 2009 2011 2007 2009 2011 2007 2009 2011
Calorie (kcal, 000) 3.40 3.48 2.28 9.02 9.18 6.66 4.69 6.44 5.15
Protein (kcal, 000) 0.29 0.31 0.22 0.86 1.01 0.67 0.43 0.65 0.51
Fat (kcal, 000) 0.65 0.53 0.58 2.09 1.68 1.71 0.95 1.10 1.29
Fiber (kcal, 000) 0.21 0.25 0.14 0.48 0.59 0.41 0.28 0.43 0.32
Vitamin A (µg) 44.26 170.17 51.45 162.42 489.38 485.23 69.47 332.83 292.26
Vitamin D (µg) 0.28 0.15 0.47 1.25 0.72 1.66 0.51 0.42 1.21
Folate (µg) 312.27 369.30 252.98 1064.67 1142.63 852.09 488.42 763.27 619.60
Iron (mg) 26.59 31.55 17.40 62.14 76.30 54.88 35.58 55.33 41.71
Zinc (mg) 14.15 15.22 9.44 38.68 41.98 29.40 20.05 28.84 22.54
Calcium (mg) 425.09 307.20 363.33 1663.93 1265.36 1172.35 725.44 785.17 862.52
Arginine (mg) 3302.93 3438.63 2326.49 9019.92 9660.42 7780.38 4734.04 6599.27 5834.39
Histidine (mg) 2298.89 2442.64 1669.84 7021.75 7356.37 5782.98 3445.81 4914.50 4291.56
Lysine (mg) 2993.18 2936.84 2618.08 10697.22 10731.18 9043.61 4880.28 6749.10 6592.04
N 916 251 147 88 471 755 1782 1782 1782
Average macro and micro nutrients intakes of the OVC households. Bottom 25 % = Households
with per capita expenditure in the bottom quartile of the wealth distribution; Top 25 % = Households
with per capita expenditure in the top quartile of the wealth distribution; Pooled = All households
in the sample. Reported are the average nutrient intake in each sub-sample as well as in the overall
sample by year of survey. Note that the variables were all winsorized at 2%. Note: N= number of
observations; kcal= Kilo calories; mg = miligrams; µg = micrograms.
than energy intakes by OVC households in the top quartile of the per-capita con-
sumption distribution. A similar pattern is observed for both the intake of macro
(protein, fat, and fibre) and micro (vitamins, minerals, and amino acids) nutrients.
For example, in the case of a mineral like iron, a deficiency of which is a cause for
anaemia that remains a hurdle for many developing countries, there was a differ-
ence in favour of the top quartile of about 133% in 2007, 141% in 2009 and 215% in
2011. This evidence points to non-linearities in per-capita nutrients intake among
OVC households, which we explore below using a partial linear panel data model.
Table 1.3 reports descriptive statistics on the share of calories attributable to the
food groups, which is an indicator of food energy sources for the households. Both
poor and rich OVC households get a significant share of their calories from cheap
sources like maize flour, indicating their ultra-poor status, but the proportion of calo-
ries from cereal is higher for the former group. Healthy components of diets, such as
Chapter 1. Nutrient Income Elasticity in Ultra-Poor Households: Evidence from
Kenya
10
TABLE 1.3: Share of Calories
Bottom 25 % Top 25 % Pooled
Year 2007 2009 2011 2007 2009 2011 2007 2009 2011
Cereal 0.615 0.705 0.549 0.483 0.568 0.501 0.585 0.634 0.537
Tuber 0.007 0.002 0.006 0.034 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.006 0.008
Pulse 0.036 0.046 0.068 0.065 0.076 0.066 0.0458 0.061 0.063
Fruit 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.024 0.007 0.012 0.010 0.007 0.010
Vegetable 0.006 0.008 0.014 0.003 0.007 0.013 0.006 0.008 0.012
Meat 0.024 0.014 0.040 0.078 0.059 0.069 0.037 0.035 0.057
Milk 0.018 0.008 0.023 0.029 0.026 0.041 0.021 0.020 0.034
Oil 0.137 0.079 0.099 0.140 0.078 0.090 0.133 0.080 0.095
Sugar 0.148 0.105 0.074 0.144 0.143 0.084 0.150 0.127 0.084
N 916 251 147 88 471 755 1782 1782 1782
Average share of calorie of food groups Bottom 25 % = Households with per capita expenditure in
the bottom quartile of the wealth distribution; Top 25 % = Households with per capita expenditure
in the top quartile of the wealth distribution; Pooled = All households in the sample. Reported are
the mean share of calories from the different food groups in each sub-sample as well as in the overall
sample by year of survey. Note: N=number of observations.
fruits and vegetables, do not seem to be essential sources of calories for these house-
holds; still, they are a more important source of calories for top quartile than bottom
quartile OVC households. Oil and sugar, which are associated with dietary diseases
like Diabetes and heart-related diseases, are more important sources of calories (for
both poor and rich OVC households) than fruits and vegetables.
Given the results from above, it is perhaps not surprising that a significant chunk
of the OVC household’s food budget - e.g. about 34% in 2011 in the overall sample
- is on average spent on cereals (see Table 1.4 ). After cereals, oil and vegetables are
the food groups that account for the highest portions of food budgets. However,
both decreased over time, in particular for poorer OVC households.
The overall picture emerging from the descriptive statistics is that nutrient in-
takes, calorie shares, and food budget shares partly vary over time and across house-
holds with different wealth status. We will explore these observations in more detail
in the econometric analysis below.
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TABLE 1.4: Share of Food Expenditure
Bottom 25 % Top 25 % Pooled
Year 2007 2009 2011 2007 2009 2011 2007 2009 2011
Cereal 0.309 0.494 0.365 0.223 0.352 0.311 0.279 0.406 0.341
Tuber 0.050 0.030 0.034 0.049 0.043 0.038 0.048 0.035 0.040
Pulse 0.032 0.053 0.065 0.056 0.078 0.059 0.040 0.068 0.058
Fruit 0.016 0.023 0.018 0.030 0.023 0.027 0.020 0.024 0.024
Vegetable 0.137 0.117 0.085 0.073 0.083 0.069 0.122 0.097 0.073
Meat 0.077 0.073 0.071 0.247 0.202 0.196 0.124 0.147 0.152
Milk 0.089 0.078 0.085 0.056 0.077 0.061 0.079 0.084 0.066
Oil 0.0773 0.0714 0.0764 0.0555 0.0562 0.0583 0.0700 0.0620 0.0629
Sugar 0.0855 0.0822 0.0693 0.0682 0.0724 0.0626 0.0834 0.0783 0.0674
N 916 251 147 88 471 755 1751 1776 1754
Average food expenditure share of each food group. Note: Bottom 25 % = Households with per capita expen-
diture in the bottom quartile of the wealth distribution; Top 25 % = Households with per capita expenditure in
the top quartile of the wealth distribution; Pooled = All households in the sample; N= number of observations.
Reported are the average food expenditure share of each food group in each sub-sample by year.
1.3 Methodology
As highlighted above, three issues need to be addressed when estimating the calo-
rie or nutrient-wealth elasticity: Measurement error, simultaneity bias, and non-
linearity in the relationship between the two variables. We employ heteroskedasticity-
restriction IV estimation proposed by Lewbel (2012) and recently extended to a panel
data framework by Meijer et al. (2017) to address the endogeneity of total expendi-
ture due to measurement error; standard panel IV methods to deal with both mea-
surement error and simultaneity bias; and the partial linear panel data approach of
Baltagi and Li (2002) to account for non-linearity in the relationship between nutrient
or caloric intake and wellbeing.
1.3.1 Measurement Error and Endogeneity
We use total per-capita household expenditure on food and non-food items as a
measure of wealth in an OVC household. Total expenditure is a better proxy of
wealth than total income as it comes closer to measuring permanent income. Its
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main drawback is that it may suffer from measurement error, e.g. because total ex-
penditure does contain items that are not regularly purchased (Meghir and Robin,
1992). When total expenditure is combined with caloric availability in a regression
model, this maybe a source of common measurement error, which arises if total ex-
penditure and caloric intake are derived from the same data source and as a result
measurement error in one could correlate with measurement error in the other. This
phenomenon is likely to occur in survey data where tendencies for error affect series
of self-reported variables (De Nadai and Lewbel, 2016). Bouis and Haddad (1992)
were the first to indicate that the common measurement error leads to a positive
bias in estimated calorie-income elasticities. Thus, it is different from the classi-
cal error-in-variables problem that biases estimated coefficients towards zero, com-
monly known as the attenuation bias. Griliches and Hausman (1986) have shown
that in the presence of measurement error the use of panel data techniques such as
the within or between estimator will likely exacerbate such bias.
Conceptual Framework
The model we estimate can be described as:
Ynt = Xntβ+ r′ntδ+ αn + ent (1.3)
where Ynt denotes the logarithm of per capita calorie or nutrient intake by household
n at time t; Xnt is the logarithm of per capita expenditure by household n at time
t; rnt is a vector of exogenous covariates (including both household characteristics
such as household size, age, and demographic ratios, and village-level indicators
such as access to roads, markets, water and sewage systems) for household n; at
time t, which are assumed to be measurement error free; αn denotes household fixed
effects; and ent is the error term with zero mean. Suppose Xnt cannot be observed
as it is measured with error due to reasons outlined by Bouis and Haddad (1992),
hence, because of the commonality of measurement error Ynt is also mismeasured.
Therefore, what we observe is Y∗nt and X∗nt with error ϕnt and υnt, respectively. The
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relationship between Ynt and Y∗nt and Xnt and X∗nt is described as:
Y∗nt = Ynt + ϕnt (1.4)
X∗nt = Xnt + υnt (1.5)
Now assume that the measurement errors ϕnt and υnt are independent of the true
values of the mismeasured variables (i.e. classical measurement error) and of rnt ,
then, the reduced-form model from equation 1.3 above is given as:
Y∗nt = X∗ntβ+ r′ntδ+ αn + µnt (1.6)
Where µnt = ent + ϕnt− υntβ . It is obvious that X∗nt is endogenous (i.e. correlated
with υnt) even if Xnt is not. To capture the issue of correlated measurement error, let
us suppose that the measurement error ϕnt of Y∗nt is given as ϕnt = θυnt + εnt, which
implies that µnt = ent + εnt + υnt(θ − β). Assume further that ent and εnt are id-
iosyncratic errors for X∗nt and ϕnt, respectively, and they are not correlated to each
other. Then, the only source of bias is via the correlation of X∗nt with υnt; this can
clearly be seen from equation 1.5. Hence, even though by assumption Xnt and υnt
are not correlated, the correlation between X∗nt (i.e. per capita expenditure) and υnt
(i.e. measurement error ) makes panel OLS estimation of equation 1.6 inconsistent.
Therefore, by instrumenting the term υnt(θ − β), we can consistently estimate equa-
tion 1.6.
A standard way to address the outlined endogeneity problem is to use instru-
mental variable methods where the endogenous regressor is instrumented with a
variable such as income that is assumed to be exogenous (like in Gibson and Rozelle,
2002). In our case, such standard instruments are not available. However, even if
standard external instruments are hard to come by, one can use internally gener-
ated instruments to identify such models. This was first highlighted by Griliches
and Hausman (1986), who showed that a series of error-in-variables models could
be identified in a panel data framework without the need for external instruments.
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Meijer et al. (2017) suggest three approaches that rely on GMM estimated moment-
based conditions with different assumptions: restrictions on the intertemporal ma-
trix of covariance errors of the model, third-moment restrictions, and heteroskedas-
ticity restrictions. In this study, we apply the last method, which was first introduced
by Lewbel (2012). He argued that it is an ideal identification method in situations
where ordinary instruments are not available. Meijer et al. (2017) have provided
a general account of how such an approach could be implemented in a panel data
model. In particular, they have shown information from exogenous variables in dif-
ferent time periods as well as their relationship with the endogenous variable can
be used to identify mismeasured regressors. Next, we briefly discuss this approach
(For details regarding the method, see Meijer et al., 2017).
Suppose rn contains exogenous – i.e. not mismeasured – variables that are mu-
tually independent of υn and en, then, we can use the relationship between rn in
different time periods with X∗n to identify the structural model. Meijer et al. (2017)
have shown that this can be done when the relationship between rn and X∗n is het-
eroskedastic, an observation first made by Lewbel (2012) for a cross-sectional data
context. Suppose a linear relationship between Xn and rn is as follows:
Xn = rnκ +ωn (1.7)
with qn ≡ υnt +ωn, then from equation 1.5 it implies that X∗n = rnκ+ qn. Assume
the relationship between X∗n and rn is heteroskedastic (i.e. E(qnq′n|rn) 6= 0). If we as-
sume further that E(qn|rn) = 0 and E(µn|rn) = 0, then, any instrument Zn such that
E(Z′nµn) = 0 also involves satisfying the other two moment conditions (particularly,
that rn and υn are independent) implies that Zn = r′nqn can be used to consistently
identify β and δ. Therefore, if qn was observable, the use of Zn as an instrument
for identification would be straightforward, but it is unobservable. However, it can
be replaced by it estimates qˆn, which is obtained from the regression of X∗n on rn.
The generated instruments from this procedure can be used to get consistent esti-
mates for models with mismeasured regressors. our case of mismeasured m, Zn is a
generated instrument and can be used to consistently identify the model.
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We follow the recommendation of Lewbel (2012) to include the number of as-
sets owned by the household, mean community nonfood expenditure, age of the
household head, education level of the household head, and gender of the house-
hold head as variables in rn that can be used to generate the internal instruments.
For these variables to be valid variables for identification, their relationship with X∗nt
should be heteroskedastic.
In line with Meijer et al. (2017), we proceed as follows to generate the instru-
ments: First, for each period given as t = 1, 2, 3, we regress X∗nt on rns, s = 1, 2, 3; i.e
for each time period, the endogenous regressor in that time period is regressed on
values of the exogenous regressors in all time period (i.e.rn1, rn2, and rin3). Second,
for each of the three regressions in step one, we generate the residual qˆnt. Third, we
generate (T=3) set of instruments of znt (i.e zn1; zn2; zn3) from the product rntqˆnt; this
leaves us with a total of fifteen generated instruments (five instruments in each time
period). Finally, we perform a panel IV estimation with the generated instruments.
Note that when the data is transformed into a panel structure, the dimension of the
instruments reduces from fifteen to five. Our panel IV model is thus over-identified.
We apply the Sargan-Hansen test to check for over-identification as an indication of
the validity of the instruments.
Note that this procedure leads to consistent estimation only when measurement
error is the only source of endogeneity. Thus, the estimates might not be consistent
under the presence of simultaneity bias. In this regard, we check for sensitivity of
the results from this approach to the presence of simultaneity bias by combining the
generated instruments with the standard or baseline instrument (locality mean non-
food expenditure). Given that the computation of this instrument does not involve
data on total food consumption, it cannot be a source of common measurement er-
ror. For a similar reason, the instrument does not suffer from the problem of reverse
causality. Skoufias et al. (2009) also argued in favour of the exogeneity of the instru-
ment. In this regard, the instrument can be considered to be freed from both the
reverse causality and correlated measurement error problem, which justifies using it
as a baseline instrument.
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Apart from measurement error, another problem that might affect the identifica-
tion of the elasticity parameter β is endogeneity due to simultaneity bias. Specifi-
cally, it might be the case that the direction of causation between caloric or nutrient
intake and household wealth occurs in both directions, i.e. higher intake of calo-
ries or nutrients leads to more productivity due to better health and this, in turn,
can cause higher wealth (Skoufias et al., 2011). To address this problem, we follow
Skoufias et al. (2011) and instrument total expenditure with mean locality house-
hold nonfood expenditure, computed at the household level by excluding each nth
household at a time, via a standard panel data instrumental variable technique. As a
argued in the preceding paragraph, the instrument does not suffer from both reverse
causality and correlated measurement error problem.
1.3.2 Non-Linearity
As discussed above, previous research has shown that nonlinearities in the relation-
ship between calories or nutrients and income might also affect the elasticity param-
eters of interest. To address this issue, we use a semi-parametric panel data model.
Among the different classes of semi-parametric models suggested in the literature
(See Yatchew, 1998), we choose Baltagi and Li (2002) variant of the partial-linear
model. This model allows us to capture nonlinearity in the relationship between
nutrient or caloric intake and wellbeing while at the same time making it possible to
parametrically include other variables order than wellbeing that might affect caloric
or nutrient intake.
Conceptual Framework
The model we estimate can be specified as follows:
ynt = r
′
ntγ+ g(xnt)θ + unt (1.8)
where ynt denotes the energy, macronutrient or micro-nutrients index variable
for household n in year t; rnt represents a vector of other exogenous time variant
characteristics of household n in period t; g(xnt) is a non-parametric function of
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per-capita household wealth for household n in period t; it captures possible non-
linearities in the relationship between Ynt and xnt; unt is a one-way error component
disturbance given as unt = µn + vnt; µn denotes household time-invariant fixed ef-
fects and vnt is a random component that is assumed to follow a normal distribution.
To estimate the model, we first perform first-differencing to eliminate the house-
hold fixed effects, µn. Hence, we have:
Ynt = Rntγ+ G(xnt, xnt−1)θ +Unt (1.9)
Where Ynt = ynt − ynt−1 Rnt = rnt − rnt−1, G(xnt, xnt−1) = g(xnt) − g(xnt−1),
and Unt = unt − unt−1. In estimating γ and θ, we follow Baltagi and Li (2002) and
use a series-based method. This method avoids two shortcomings that are associ-
ated with the alternative kernel-based method suggested by Li and Stengos (1996),
namely: (1) the fact that first-differencing increases the dimension of the problem
(curse-of-dimensionality problem); and (2) the fact that it cannot be used to get
the original non-parametric function of interest g(xnt). We proceed by using a se-
ries of the form pk(x) with dimension Kx1 to approximate g(x). If pk(x) can ap-
proximate any function in g∈G as K grows, then, pk(x) can approximate g(x) and
pk(xnt − xnt−1) = pk(xnt)− pk(xnt−1) can approximate G(xnt, xnt−1), where pk(x) are
the first k terms of a sequence of functions (p1(x), p2(x), ..., pk(x)). Hence, equation 1.9
can be re-written as:
ynt − ynt−1 = (rnt − rnt−1)γ+ (pk(xnt)− pk(xnt−1))θ + unt − unt−1 (1.10)
Thus, the series term adds an additive structure to the problem. OLS estimates
of γ and θ from equation 1.10 are consistent. Note, however, this is true if and only
if xn is exogenous, i.e. it does not suffer from the reverse causality and measurement
error problems discussed in preceding section. Hence, if xn is not exogenous, then,
the estimation of equation 1.10 via panel OLS leads to bias point estimates for θ. But
if one assumes that the bias due to the endogeneity of xnt does not change over the
support of xnt, then, the function pk(xn) might not be bias even though the point
estimates are bias; this allows us to comment on the behaviour of the nonparametric
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estimates despite a possible bias in the point estimates.
Having estimated θ and γ, we follow Libois and Verardi (2013) and use equation
1.8 to fit the fixed effects term of the model, get an estimate of the disturbance term
residual, µˆnt, and then estimate the non-parametric term using standard nonpara-
metric regression techniques. An important consideration in estimating the model
is to select the right series for pk, which can be considered as a spline. A partic-
ular kind of splines called B-splines are used; such splines avoids the problem of
high correlation between successive terms associated with linear splines. For details
regarding this procedure (See Newson, 2000).
1.4 Results
Our findings from the parametric estimations are reported in Table 1.5. As a base-
line, column 1 shows the results from a fixed effects model that is estimated using the
within estimator, i.e. assuming that individual specific unobserved effects are not in-
dependent of observed covariates.2 Extensions of the baseline model to account for
simultaneity bias and measurement error, as discussed in section 1.3.1, are reported,
respectively, in columns 2 and 3 of Table 1.5. While the IV model for addressing si-
multaneity bias is exactly identified, the IV model for addressing measurement error
is over-identified. Hence, in the latter case, we checked for over-identifying restric-
tions - that is the validity of instruments - using the Hansen-Sargan test; the p-values
from the test are also reported in the table. Each of the nutrient-elasticity estimates
shown in Table 1.5 was obtained controlling for other observable characteristics at
the household and village level as discussed in Section 1.2. The results for the con-
trol variables are not reported here but can be made available upon request. Note
that for the model estimated with the generated instruments used as IVs, before gen-
erating the instruments, it is important to check whether the relationship between
the exogenous and endogenous variables is heteroskedastic . To check for this, we
did scatter plots of the generated instruments and the endogenous regressor; the
results are reported in appendix A. All the scatterplots indicate the presence of a
2 We checked for the validity of the assumption by doing a Hausman test that compares this esti-
mator with the FGLS estimator of an error component model. The results, not reported, indicate that
non-randomness of the unobserved effect cannot be rejected; hence, a fixed effect model is a valid spec-
ification. Besides, the F test indicated that the within estimator is preferred over the between estimator.
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heteroskedastic relationship, which imply that the relationship between the exoge-
nous and endogenous variables can be used to identify the model with measurement
error.
The results from the panel OLS estimation show that the calorie total expendi-
ture elasticity in the OVC households is about 0.49, and highly statistically signif-
icant. This implies that for every percentage increase in wealth, expressed here in
terms of log per capita expenditure, these households increase their intake of calo-
ries by about 49 percentage points. If we control for a possible simultaneity bias, we
obtain a lower calorie-expenditure elasticity of about 0.39. The calorie elasticity de-
creases further to about 0.19 when measurement error is addressed using generated
instruments from the Meijer et al. (2017) approach.3 Thus, the fixed-effects estimates
exhibit a considerable upward-bias. So, even after accounting for simultaneity and
measurement error, the relationship between calorie intakes and per-capita expen-
diture remains positive and statistically significant. A similar pattern holds for the
majority of nutrients, with some notable exceptions: first, the intake of two macronu-
trients – fat and fibre – are found to be unresponsive to changes in per-capita expen-
ditures in the IV regression with generated instruments. Second, the elasticities for
vitamin A and D, as well as calcium, rise relative to the fixed-effects model when si-
multaneity bias or measurement error is addressed. Overall, elasticities of nutrients
tend to be higher than the elasticity of calories, which points to a tendency among
households to switch to food richer in nutrients as their wealth rises. With an expen-
diture elasticity of above unity, calcium and vitamin A stand out in this regard.
Tests for weak instruments in the model identified via generated instruments
are reported in Table 1.6. The F-statistics in all the nutrient elasticity estimations
are above the recommended rule of thumb value of 10 by Staiger and Stock (1994),
which indicates that the instruments are relevant for identifying the model under
measurement error. However, given that this rule of thumb is not always sufficient,
an alternative test for weak instruments suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002) is based
on the Cragg-Donald (CD) statistic and they provided the relevant critical values of
the test. Since we are using five external instruments to identify a single endogenous
regressor, allowing for 5 per cent maximal IV bias means that the relevant CD critical
3 With a p-value of 0.435, the Hansen-Sargan test indicates that the model is over-identified.
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TABLE 1.5: Nutrient Income Elasticity from Panel Regressions
FE IV Hetero IVHetero
Calorie 0.485(0.0145)∗∗∗ 0.387(0.0478)∗∗∗ 0.188(0.0698)∗∗∗ 0.331(0.0594)∗∗∗
[0.435] [0.157]
price of calorie 0.516(0.0133)∗∗∗ 0.647(0.0437)∗∗∗ 0.648(0.0651)∗∗∗ 0.812(0.0493)∗∗∗
[0.020] [0.044]
Protein 0.683(0.0149)∗∗∗ 0.617(0.0488)∗∗∗ 0.357(0.0752)∗∗∗ 0.601(0.0687)∗∗∗
[0.540] [0.177]
Fat 0.682(0.0199)∗∗∗ 0.577(0.0691)∗∗∗ −0.154(0.1612) 0.535(0.0457)∗∗∗
[.087] [0.208]
Fiber 0.573(0.0184)∗∗∗ 0.502(0.0596)∗∗∗ 0.095(0.1002) 0.482(0.0786)∗∗∗
[0.143] [0.092]
Iron 0.600(0.0186)∗∗∗ 0.532(0.0605)∗∗∗ 0.347(0.1014)∗∗∗ 0.528(0.0860)∗∗∗
[0.259] [0.253]
Zinc 0.622(0.0162)∗∗∗ 0.536(0.0537)∗∗∗ 0.342(0.0860)∗∗∗ 0.519(0.0783)∗∗∗
[0.359] [0.127]
Calcium 1.173(0.0286)∗∗∗ 1.360(0.0932)∗∗∗ 1.351(0.1422)∗∗∗ 1.389(0.0903)∗∗∗
[0.847] [0.924]
Vitamin A 0.976(0.0583)∗∗∗ 1.675(0.2122)∗∗∗ 1.124(0.1985)∗∗∗ 1.429(0.3025)∗∗∗
[0.431] [0.747]
Vitamin D 0.497(0.0481)∗∗∗ 0.095(0.2107) 0.599(0.1593)∗∗∗ 0.436(0.0968)∗∗∗
[ 0.400] [0.807]
Folate 0.810(0.0202)∗∗∗ 0.756(0.0666)∗∗∗ 0.437(0.1053)∗∗∗ 0.690(0.0923)∗∗∗
[0.094] [0.410]
Arginine 0.715(0.0202)∗∗∗ 0.650(0.0688)∗∗∗ 0.540(0.1088)∗∗∗ 0.689(0.1861)∗∗∗
[0.494] [0.267]
Histidine 0.710(0.0156)∗∗∗ 0.605(0.0530)∗∗∗ 0.432(0.592)∗∗∗ 0.563(0.0643)∗∗∗
[0.0827] [0.323]
Lysine 0.847(0.0170)∗∗∗ 0.733(0.0563)∗∗∗ 0.530(.0877)∗∗∗ 0.807(0.0686)∗∗∗
[0.529] [0.301]
Reported are the estimates of the calorie or nutrient income elasticities from the panel regressions.
Note: FE = Estimation results of the panel fixed effects estimated using the estimator; IV= Estima-
tion results from panel instrumental variables with locality mean nonfood expenditure as the only
instrument. Hetero= Estimation results from panel instrumental variable model with five generated
instruments from heteroskadasticity restrictions; IVHetero= estimation results from panel instrumen-
tal variables model with mean locality nonfood expenditure and the five generated instruments; the
robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses; In the last two columns, reported in brackets
are the p-values from the Hansen-Sargant over-identification tes; fixed effect model is estimated using
the within estimator and the overidentified models are estimated using GMM. Significance levels: ***
99% significance; ** 95% significance; *90% significance.
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value for us is 18.7. In all the nutrient elasticity estimations, we obtain a CD statistic
that is markedly higher than the critical value, which again indicates that our gen-
erated instruments IVs do not appear to suffer from a weak instruments problem.
The Anderson-Rubin test, p-values shown in the three row of Table 1.6, which are
robust against the presence of weak instruments, corroborates the evidence from the
CD statistics.
As discussed in section 1.3.1, the generated instruments via the Meijer et al.
(2017) method might not be robust against simultaneity bias. To this end, we did
a sensitivity analysis of the generated instruments to simultaneity bias by combing
them with the baseline instrument, which by construction does not suffer from mea-
surement error bias. The results of this estimation are reported in the last column
of Table 1.5. From the estimates, we see that the nutrient elasticity estimates under
this column are higher than the previous column, which indicates that using the
generated instruments leads to an over-correction of the OLS bias. For per capita
calorie intakes for example, the estimates from a model with the combined instru-
ments reports a calorie elasticity of about 0.33, which is close to the calorie elasticity
of 0.39 from the panel IV with the baseline instrument than the calorie elasticity of
0.19 from the model with the generated instruments. However, the model with the
baseline instrument imply slightly more efficient estimates as the standard errors
are a bit smaller. Therefore, the model identified via the standard instruments is
overall better. A similar observation can be made from the elasticity estimates of the
macro and micro nutrients. In all the elasticity estimates, the test for overidentifi-
cation using the Sargan-Hansen test are satisfactory. In this regard, the sensitivity
analysis results show that the elasticity estimates arrived at using the standard in-
strument are more reliable. This is not surprising given that the Meijer et al. (2017)
instruments corrects for just endogeneity due to measurement error bias.
Now we turn to the results from the semi-parametric model. In line with the
discussions above, we estimate the non-parametric component, g(xnt), employing
a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression. For our discussions here, we focus
on the fitted curves from the estimations reported in Figure 1.1, which shows how
the various nutrients relate to log per-capita expenditure. The blue dotted line on
each graph represent a linear fit of the main regression function. The two vertical
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FIGURE 1.1: Nonparametric Estimation Results
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Partial linear model estimation of the relationship between calorie or nutrient and per capita expendi-
ture. The shaded areas on the graphs are the 95% confidence bands. The first and second red dashed
vertical lines represent, respectively, the bottom and top quartile of per capita expenditure. The doted
blue lines are linear fits of the main model, which shows how the nonparametric representation devi-
ates from linearity.
dotted lines represent the bottom and top quartile of per capita total expenditure,
respectively. For details regarding the relationship between nutrients intake and the
other household characteristics, see Table A.1; given that the point estimates of the
partial linear models might be bias, these results should be viewed with care.
We find that per-capita calorie intake increases monotonically with log per-capita
expenditure, but the growth rate slows down at higher levels of expenditure, which
implies that with the same growth in expenditure, the increase in calorie intake is
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lower at higher expenditure levels. This result is consistent with previous studies
(e.g. Behrman and Deolalikar, 1987; Tian and Yu, 2015). In addition, when we com-
pare the linear fit to the nonparametric fit of the nutrient elasticity estimate, we see
for the case of calories a statistically significant deviations from linearity at higher
per capita expenditure levels; this reinforces the finding that the elasticity of calorie
intakes, even for ultrapoor households, differs between poor and rich households.
In terms of economic significance, the deviation from linearity is not that sizable;
for calories, it is about 0.025 at log per capita expenditure of 10. Food quality as
measured by the price of calories also increases continuously with per-capita expen-
ditures of the OVC households, with one notable exception: at very low levels of
expenditure, an increase in expenditure is associated with a statistically significant
decline in food quality of up to 20% before it starts to increase. This is in contrast to
what Skoufias et al. (2011) found for poor households in Mexico. The growing part
of the curve is steepest at very high expenditure levels, i.e. at the upper tail, where
the elasticity of food quality for per-capita expenditure is highest. 4
The general pattern that emerges for per-capita calories also holds for most nu-
trients. The intake of all macronutrients considered here (fibre, protein, and fat)
increase with higher per-capita expenditures. As shown by the vertical dashed lines
in the graphs, the macronutrients’ responsiveness is stronger for per-capita expendi-
tures in the bottom quartile in the top quartile. Likewise, except vitamin D, for which
the curve first declines and then flattens, micronutrient intake increases as per-capita
expenditure rises, the slope of the curves being somewhat flatter for households in
the top quartile than for households in the bottom quartile. Furthermore, in all the
graphs, we see statistically significant deviations from linearity at higher per capita
expenditure levels. Therefore, even though calories or nutrients tend to generally
increase with wealth, the rate of increase is more pronounced for poorer households
than it is for richer households. In terms, of magnitudes the deviations do not seem
that sizeable.
Overall, all graphs in Figure 1.1 points to a non-linear relationship between caloric
and nutrition indices and log per-capita expenditure that our nonparametric model
4Note that the confidence bands tend to be wider at the tails. This implies less precise estimates,
which is likely to be due to the presence of fewer households.
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TABLE 1.6: IV/GMM Estimation Test Statistics
Calorie Price calorie Protein Fat Fiber Iron Zinc Calcium Vit. A Vit. D Folate Arginine Histine Lysine
F-stats 19.4 15.88 15.10 15.43 15.43 15.43 15.32 15.43 16.79 12.48 15.34 15.32 15.32 15.32
CD-stats+ 34.05 28.56 27.09 27.58 27.58 27.58 27.41 27.58 24.72 26.02 27.42 27.41 27.41 27.41
AR 0.090 0.000 0.160 0.008 0.078 0.017 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.000
Endo 0.000 0.134 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.192 0.472 0.489 0.001 0.085 0.001 0.000
Various test of instrument validity from the panel IV estimation of the model with generated instruments. The statistics are reported for each nutrient elasticity as well as
the elasticity of the price of calorie. Note: 1 Since we are insrtumenting one endogeneous variable with five external instruments, the applicable Stock-Yogo critical value at
5% maximal IV relative bias is 18.37. Therefore, the Cragg Donald statistics should be compared with this critical value. 2. F-start= first stage F-statistics; CD= Cragg-Donald
Statistics; AR=Anderson Robin test p-value; Endo= P-values for Endogeneity test.
captures better.
1.5 Summary and Conclusion
Despite large existing literature, the issue of whether and to what extent additional
income can help poor households meet their dietary needs is still not fully resolved.
In this study, we provide new evidence on calorie-expenditure and nutrient-expenditure
elasticities in the so far largely overlooked setting of ultra-poor households in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Employing panel data estimation techniques that control for simul-
taneity and measurement error bias, we find for a sample of close to 1800 Kenyan
OVC households that higher per-capita expenditures are generally associated with
higher calorie and nutrient intake. Richer OVC households tend to consume food
richer in macro and micronutrients than poorer OVC households. Food quality also
tends to be better in richer OVC households than in poorer ones. A policy impli-
cation of these findings is that social protection schemes such as social assistance in
the form of income transfers have the potential to help poor households get access
to better diets.
From a methodological point of view, our results suggest that biases resulting
from simultaneity and measurement error are considerable, rendering it essential
to control for them. We also find that even in extremely poor households there are
non-linearities in calorie and nutrient intake, which we accommodate by using a
semi-parametric model. A shortcoming of our study is that when accounting for
non-linearity we rely on a very restrictive assumption regarding bias due to endo-
geneity, which we do not account for as models for estimating a partial linear model
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where the non-parametric term is endogenous are not yet well developed; thus, this
is something we leave for future research.
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FIGURE A.1: Scatterplot: Asset Ownership
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Graph shows scatterplots of the generated instrumental variables (on vertical axis) and the endoge-
neous regressor (PCEnt, t = 1, 2, 3). iv1t = generated instrument from asset ownership (i.e. rn1t) in
period t, t = 1, 2, 3, PCE= Per Capita Expenditure.
Appendix A. Additional Tables and Figures 34
FIGURE A.2: Scatterplot: Mean Nonfood Expenditure
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Graph shows scatterplots of the generated instrumental variables (on vertical axis) and the endoge-
neous regressor (PCEnt, t = 1, 2, 3). iv2t = generated instrument from mean nonfood expenditure (i.e.
rn2t) in period t, t = 1, 2, 3, PCE= Per Capita Expenditure.
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FIGURE A.3: Scatterplot: Age of the Household Head
iv
31
0 5000 10000 15000
PCE1
iv
32
0 5000 10000 15000 20000
PCE2
iv
33
0 10000 20000 30000
PCE3
Graph shows scatterplots of the generated instrumental variables (on vertical axis) and the endoge-
neous regressor (PCEnt, t = 1, 2, 3). iv3t = generated instrument from age of the household head (i.e.
rn3t) in period t, t = 1, 2, 3, PCE= Per Capita Expenditure.
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FIGURE A.4: Scatterplot: Education Status of the Household Head
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Graph shows scatterplots of the generated instrumental variables (on vertical axis) and the endoge-
neous regressor (PCEnt, t = 1, 2, 3). iv4t = generated instrument from education status of the house-
hold head (i.e. rn4t) in period t, t = 1, 2, 3, PCE= Per Capita Expenditure.
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FIGURE A.5: Scatterplot: Gender of the Household Head
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Graph shows scatterplots of the generated instrumental variables (on vertical axis) and the endoge-
neous regressor (PCEnt, t = 1, 2, 3). iv5t = generated instrument from gender of the household head
(i.e. rn5t) in period t, t = 1, 2, 3, PCE= Per Capita Expenditure.
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Chapter 2
Access to Formal Savings and
Household Welfare: Evidence from
Gambia
2.1 Introduction
Despite much progress being made in the fight against poverty, poverty continues
to be a bottleneck; between 1990 and 2013, the world has witnessed a remarkable
decline in poverty – about 35 percent according to reports by the World Bank. How-
ever yet still many people, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), continue to be
poor; about 330 million people in the region live below the poverty line of $1.90 per
day (Beegle et al., 2016). One intervention that can be effective in bringing economic
prosperity to the poor in this region is financial inclusion (FI). Evidence has shown
that access to financial services like saving has the potential to spur economic de-
velopment and growth by facilitating consumption smoothening, helping in capital
accumulation, and investment in health and education (Pande, 2012). Given that
lack of access to finance can be a source of persistent inequality (See Banerjee and
Newman, 1993), financial inclusion can also promote inclusive economic develop-
ment through social equity (Beck et al., 2007).
However, in developing countries, especially fragile and conflict-affected coun-
tries in SSA, access to financial services like formal savings is still low. According
to the Global Findex report 2017 by Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2017), only 27 percent of
adults in these places have a regular account. Even though smart technologies like
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mobile money are revolutionising formal account access in low-income countries,
overall the gains have been modest Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2017). The low access rate
of formal financial services in developing countries can be explained by both de-
mand and supply side constraints (Karlan et al., 2014). On the supply side, factors
such as high transaction cost, lack of trust of financial institutions, and regulatory
restrictions make it harder for the poor to access saving products. On the demand
side, factors such as low financial literacy, lack of motivation to hold accounts, social
constraint, and behavioural biases have been cited as factors that inhibit access to
formal financial services. Hence, these factors can limit the ability of formal saving
providers to act as a catalyst to economic growth (Pande, 2012).
Thus, there has been a surge in interest among development economist and prac-
titioners to understand how the easing of the highlighted constraints could help the
poor to access more saving products, and consequently whether access to such prod-
ucts contributes to economic development by generating downstream effects on the
wellbeing of the poor. Most of the evidence that exists thus far, though still scanty
and inconclusive, suggest that financial inclusion through saving has the potential
to improve welfare. In particular, evidence has shown that access to financial ser-
vices (both saving and credit) can help households to address risk associated with
consumption (See Dupas and Robinson, 2013b; Jack and Suri, 2014), enhance food
security in recipient households (See Dupas et al., 2017), empower women (Ashraf
et al., 2010), and also boost entrepreneurship development among women (Dupas
and Robinson, 2013a). In a recent systematic review of the existing evidence in SSA
via a meta-analysis, Steinert et al. (2018) find that “saving promotions” can generate
a positive impact on poverty reduction by increasing household welfare, increasing
returns from private entrepreneurship, and enhancing food security. Similar evi-
dence is reported by Pande (2012).
Therefore, the existing evidence, albeit limited, has motivated an emergence of
what appears to be a consensus that it is possible for access to formal saving to pro-
duce positive welfare impact on households thereby promoting inclusive economic
growth and development. This insurgence of evidence has made the promotion of
saving a foci part of the global agenda to promote financial inclusion of the poor as a
means for achieving the 2030 Agenda; the G-20 Financial Inclusion Action Plan and
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the Maya Declaration championed by the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) are
examples of such global initiatives.
Regarding why access to saving might improve household welfare, researchers
have suggested three central pathways through which this happens (Steinert et al.,
2018): Firstly, saving motivates households to make a higher investment into as-
sets that enhance longterm wellbeing. Secondly, access to saving can act as a buffer
against unforeseen economic shocks. Thirdly, saving products help holders to deal
with self-control problems and other behavioural shortcomings.
Despite the empirical evidence on access to saving increasing significantly in
recent years, it is still limited when compared to other aspects of financial inclu-
sion such as access to credit (Cull et al., 2014). Furthermore, when it comes to
Sub-Saharan Africa, where most of the evidence is based, much attention is paid
to few countries such as Kenya and Uganda (See Sabet and Brown, 2018). Thus,
not much specific evidence exists for other countries whose agents face different
economic realities. Hence, understanding the impact of saving from a perspective
different from these countries should be an addition to the literature; especially con-
sidering that experimental results are usually very context dependent. Furthermore,
the evidence on the impact of access to saving products on household welfare is
still limited (Steinert et al., 2018). One reason for this might be that in experimental
studies, where most of the rigorous evidence is found, the ability to provide precise
estimates of downstream effects on outcomes such as education or health spending
or business investment depends not only on take-up rates but also usage rates. If the
latter is low, it makes it challenging to ascertain the precise impact of the innovations
on well-being; for example, in Dupas et al. (2018) this was raised as a potential issue.
Therefore, the central motivation of this paper is to contribute to the literature
from the perspective of the issues above regarding welfare impacts of access to for-
mal savings. Specifically, I want to add to the scanty evidence of the effects of saving
on household well-being; especially, on indicators such as consumption, education
spending, and asset ownership. Although the evidence on the welfare impact of sav-
ing on these outcomes has been increasing, as discussed above, it is still limited when
compared to other areas of financial inclusion such as access to credit. Hence, this
is a limitation as a lack of sufficient evidence makes the implementation of strategic
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reviews with enough power tricky, which consequently affects the extent to which
results can be given a general perspective. Therefore, more empirical evidence will
help in this regard. Another aim of the study is to provide rigorous evidence on
the impact of access to formal saving on household welfare in Gambia. Like many
developing countries, access to formal saving in Gambia is very low. According
to Jaabi (2017), more than 70 per cent of the population in Gambia are financially
excluded, and only about 16 per cent hold bank accounts. Thus, the promotion of
financial inclusion, especially access to basic saving accounts that could be a means
to more access of other financial services such as credit, is part of the government’s
agenda to boost inclusive economic development and growth in Gambia. However,
until now no rigorous evidence exists on whether access to formal saving can con-
tribute to poverty reduction in Gambia. Thus, this study also aims at adding to the
filling of these gaps.
To this effect, I use quasi-experimental causal inference methods to study the im-
pact of access to financial services on household welfare in Gambia. Specifically, a
propensity score matching with kernel ridge regression and doubly robust causal
inference methods are used to evaluate the impact of formal saving on household
outcomes such as education spending, health spending, food consumption, asset
ownership, and total expenditure. The data I use come from Gambia Integrated
Household Survey (IHS) 2015/16, which is a representative nationwide household
survey conducted by Gambia Bureau of Statistics with some financial and technical
assistance from the World Bank under the Capacity Building and Economic Man-
agement Project (CBEMP).
The results indicate that access to formal saving has a positive and significant
effect on households’ consumption as it increases monthly per capita total expendi-
ture and food expenditure. It also increases annual per capita education expenditure
up to 72% as well as asset ownership. Furthermore, I find that access to formal sav-
ing has positive but no significant impact on household’s out-of-pocket per capita
health expenditure. To gauge the robustness of the results against alternative speci-
fications and unobserved confounders, I also estimated the average treatment effects
using a doubly robust estimator and did sensitivity analysis using the approach of
Rosenbaum (2002); respectively. I obtained that the results from the propensity score
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matching model using kernel ridge matching are similar to those from the doubly
robust model. Also, I find that while the results for food expenditure and asset
ownership are not sensitive to mild hidden bias the results on education and food
spending are susceptible to mild hidden bias. Thus, taking together I argue that the
most robust impact holds for total expenditure and asset ownership. The effect size
I get on these indicators is similar to some found in the experimental literature on
the same topic (e.g. Prina, 2015).
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Following the introduction, in
section 2.2, I give a brief description of the current context regarding financial inclu-
sion in Gambia. Then, the methodological approach is discussed in section 2.3. The
data and sample characteristics are addressed in section 2.4. In section 3.6, I present
and explain the effect I find. Then, I end with a conclusion in section 3.7.
2.2 Financial Inclusion as a Tool to Enhance Household’s Wel-
fare in Gambia
Like many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), poverty in Gambia continues to
be a challenge. Estimates by Gambia Bureau of Statistics indicate that in 2016 about
49 percent of the population lives in absolute poverty; when compared to the abso-
lute poverty rate in 2010, this implies that between 2010 and 2016 about 150,000
of the people have moved into poverty (GBOS, 2017). For a country with such
high levels of poverty, promotion of financial inclusion via access to formal finan-
cial services has the potential to catalyse inclusive economic growth and develop-
ment thereby moving a lot of people out of poverty. Evidences from other part of
the world (See Ashraf et al., 2010; Bruhn and Love, 2014, for a review) have shown
that access to formal financial services help households to set aside money to han-
dle lump-sum expenditures (such as education expenditures, agricultural expendi-
tures, and health investment) and accommodate unexpected income shocks, which
reduces both poverty and income inequality. It is against this backdrop that financial
inclusion is heralded as an essential tool to stimulate the achievement of the sustain-
able development goals (SDGs); it has been identified to be an enabler for 7 out of
the 17 SDGs (World Bank, 2018). Consequently, the promotion of financial inclusion
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as a tool for economic and social development is a crucial goal for many developing
countries including Gambia.
In Gambia, despite the proliferation of bank and non-bank financial institution
in the past decade, still, a considerable proportion of the population does not have
access to formal financial services such as basic savings accounts. My estimates in-
dicate that just about 21% of households in Gambia have access to formal means
of saving, which is weigh below the African average of 34% - according to reports
in the Global Findex by Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2015). Despite no precise explana-
tions for the reasons for such low levels of formal financial inclusion, the reasons
that explain it could be similar to those reported in the literature (e.g. Dupas et al.,
2018). In particular, among the reasons why many people in developing countries
like Gambia are still unbanked are high participation cost, low financial literacy, and
lack of trust in financial institutions as well as lack of availability of financial service
providers in areas predominantly occupied by the poor. The latter is still a mas-
sive challenge in Gambia. Currently, about 12 commercial banks are operating in
the country and operate mostly in just urban and peri-urban areas (Tomaselli et al.,
2013); not more than 5 of the 12 commercial banks have branches in rural communi-
ties. However, even for those that have branches in rural areas, they serve mainly the
large towns in these communities. According to Sanyang and Huang (2008) one rea-
son why commercial banks limit their outreach in urban areas and to formal sector
entrepreneurs is weak policy and regulatory environment; in other words, the policy
and regulatory environment makes it unattractive for the formal financial sector to
extend their services to the poor. Against this backdrop, most households in rural ar-
eas access formal financial resources mainly through non-bank financial institutions
such as microfinance institutions, credit unions, Village Savings and Credit Associa-
tions (VISACAS), and NGO-based microfinance schemes (See Nagarajan et al., 1994,
1999).
The difficulties in access to formal financial services culminate into low levels of
formal account ownership, and this plus weak state-run social protection schemes
implies many people uses informal financial resources such Rotating Savings and
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Credit Associations (ROSCAS) and traditional money lenders as means for smooth-
ing consumption (Collins et al., 2009). However, such methods of smoothing con-
sumption are known to be both inadequate and expensive (Morduch, 1999). For
this reason, it is a commonly held belief that the promotion of access to formal fi-
nancial services by the poor and in rural areas should be among the core objectives
of the Government of The Gambia (Jaabi, 2017). Hence, as part of a broader rural
development agenda for poverty alleviation in Gambia, the government promote
financial inclusion in rural communities; however, most of the efforts are currently
concentrated on increasing financial access for agricultural development.
Regarding the impact of formal financial services, some anecdotal reports and a
qualitative study by Sanyang and Huang (2008) have indicated that access to finan-
cial resources like formal means of saving or credit produces a positive impact on
household welfare. However, until now no rigorous evidence exists to this effect.
Therefore, the specific objective of this present study is to provide rigorous evidence
on the impact of access to formal savings on household welfare in Gambia. Although
many people are still financially excluded, understanding the welfare impacts of ac-
cess to formal financial services such as formal saving on those that have access to
such services is still a significant research undertaking. It will provide a strong case
for more policy intervention in this front.
2.3 Methodology
The decision to use a quasi-experimental approach to estimate the impact of sav-
ing on well-being in Gambia is motivated by the fact that access to saving by the
households in the study was not randomised, hence, the decision to own a formal
account could be endogenous. For instance, it could be that households that own
saving products are those with better socio-economic status or better in forecasting
their future financial needs and therefore set money aside to account for them. If
such observe and unobserved factors affect both treatment assignment (here own-
ing a formal saving account) and outcomes, and they are not controlled for, then, the
impact of the treatment cannot be interpreted as causal. Hence, a study that relies
on such a measure of impact would lack internal validity. One way to deal with
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this problem is to use a quasi-experimental evaluation methods (See Imbens and
Wooldridge, 2009, for an excellent summary). In particular, one can use matching
and regression adjustment methods to find a valid estimate of the missing counter-
factual; that is what outcome would have been realised by households with access
to formal savings had it been they do not have access to formal saving. In this study,
we use this approach to identify treatment effects. Thus, next, I discuss in details the
approach.
2.3.1 Conceptual Note
Suppose a household i (where i goes from 1 to N, and N is the sum of all units
in the population) is a member of the evaluation sample. The household is either
enrolled in a saving intervention or not enrolled. Let the indicator variable denoting
enrolment be given as D, which is 1 if the household is a participant in a saving
program (in this study, I focus on formal saving, i.e. saving with a formal financial
institution) and 0 otherwise. In the framework of the Rubin causal model (discussed
in details by Imbens and Rubin, 2015), suppose the potential outcome associated
with each of these two states for the ith household is given as Yi(Di), where again i =
1, 2, . . . . . . ., N and Di = 1 if the household is participant and Di = 0 if nonparticipant.
Let the indicator of treatment status be T = 0, 1 with 1 indicating treatment receipt
and 0 otherwise. The realised outcome of each household can be represented as:
Yi = (Di)Yi(1)− (1− Di)Yi(0) (2.1)
Equation 2.1 is also known as the Fisher or Roy Model (Heckman et al., 1997). Thus,
Yi = Yi(1) if the household has access to formal saving services and Yi = Yi(0) if it
does not. One estimand of interest is the average treatment effect of having a saving
product for the ith household, which can be represented as:
ATEi = E(Yi(1))− E(Yi(0)) (2.2)
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Which means that the average treatment effect is given as the average difference in
potential outcomes between households with access to saving and households with-
out access to saving. However, in this state, it is clear that there is a problem with
this specification as Yi(D = 0) is not observed for households with a saving prod-
uct. Similarly, Yi(D = 1) is not also observed for households without a saving prod-
uct; it means that the same household cannot be a household with access to saving
and a household without access to saving concurrently. In the evaluation literature,
this phenomenon is commonly dubbed as the "fundamental problem of causal infer-
ence" believed to have been first used in this way by (Holland, 1986). According to
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) this phenomenon can be seen as a missing observation
problem since Yi(D = 0) and Yi(D = 1) are, respectively, missing outcomes for par-
ticipants and nonparticipants. Therefore, the challenge in causal inference is finding
a valid estimate of these missing counterfactuals (Cook et al., 2002). For observa-
tional studies, five main methods are popularly used: Randomisation, Diff in Diff,
instrumental variable (IV), matching methods, and recently regression discontinu-
ity; (See Khandker et al., 2009, for discussion of the first three) and (Van der Klaauw,
2008, for the last one). Another method that is attracting interest in this literature is
machine learning (See Athey, 2017)
Although the ATE is one of the main estimands of interest, it is not the only one.
Another estimand of interest could be the average treatment effect on the treated
(ATT) or the average treatment effect on the non-treated (ATNT) (See Imbens and
Wooldridge, 2009). According to Imbens (2004), the decision as to which estimand
to use should depend on the problem at hand. In this study, I adopt the ATT as
the main estimand of interest as I am interested in ascertaining the causal impact of
owning a formal saving product on the welfare of all households that have reported
in the survey that they have access to such accounts. The ATT is given as follows:
ATT = E(TE|T = 1) = E[Y(1)|T = 1]− E[Y(0)|T = 1] (2.3)
Where TE is the treatment effect. When selection bias is present, usually the case in
non-experimental settings as here where the assignment to treatment is not random,
ATT is not identified; it is, therefore, a bad proxy for the true treatment effect. It
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originates from the fact that selection bias creates a difference between the treatment
and control group even before the treatment and attaching this to the treatment is
misleading (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). As a result, if selection bias cannot be
ruled out, further assumptions have to be made on how it should be handled to
identify the estimator. As discussed above, several methods are available on how
this can be done. In this study, I use matching methods; in particular the propensity
score method and inverse probability weighting combined with regression adjust-
ment – so-called Doubly Robust (DR) estimators. As I hinted in the introduction,
the DR estimator is used to check for robustness of the PSM estimator; this is in line
with recommendations in the evaluation literature to check the robustness of results
using alternative estimation methods (e.g. Athey et al., 2017) .
Matching is a way of determining treatments effects whereby treated units are
paired to untreated units with whom they have the same observable characteris-
tics, and average treatment effects are arrived at by subtracting the average out-
come of the non-treated units from the average outcome of treated units (Heckman
et al., 1998). Matching relies on two assumptions to identify the treatment effects via
estimation of the missing counterfactual: the unconfoundedness assumption and
overlap or common support assumption. The first requires that conditional on the
observed covariates potential outcomes are independent of treatment assignment,
which means treatment is based solely on observables. The second avoids certainty
in predictability and therefore requires that units with identical covariates have a
non-zero chance of being in either the treatment or control group. The overlap as-
sumption implies that conditional distribution of covariates of units in the treat-
ment group should perfectly overlap with the conditional distribution of covariates
of units in the comparison group (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). When taking to-
gether, these two assumptions are what Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) called strong
ignorability, which when satisfied imply matching estimators identify the same pa-
rameters as experiments (Heckman et al., 1997).
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Therefore, under matching on observed covariate vector X, the treatment effects
can be summarized as:
ATT = E(TE|T = 1, X) = E[Y(1)|T = 1, X]− E[Y(0)|T = 1, X]
= E[Y(1)−Y(0)|T = 1, X]
(2.4)
PSM Approach
Since matching on each covariate in X is difficult in practice due to the curse of di-
mensionality. That is the dimension of the matching problem being higher than the
total number of observations in a dataset. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown
that under unconfoundedness and overlap matching can also be done using a single
variable such as the propensity score, p(X) = Pr(D = 1|X), which captures the like-
lihood of receiving treatment given observed covariates. Using p(X) rather than X,
reduces the matching problem from a high dimensional problem to a single dimen-
sional problem (Heckman et al., 1997) . In this case, the treatment effect estimand of
interest can be represented as:
ATTpsm = ExpP(X)|T=1E[Y(1)|T = 1, P(X)]− E[Y(0)|T = 0, P(X)] (2.5)
Where ExpP(X)|T=1 is the distribution of the propensity scores, which acts as a weight-
ing function. For ATTpsm to be a valid estimand of treatment effect, the two assump-
tions indicated above must hold. In practice, overlap in the conditional distribution
can be verified using the propensity score. Unlike overlap, unconfoundedness can-
not be directly tested. However, it might have testable implication such as checking
that the propensity scores ensure covariate balance concerning the observed covari-
ates.
From equation 2.5, it is evident that to be able to estimate the ATT I have first
to estimate the propensity scores; this can be done using either a limited dependent
variable model or using discriminant function analysis (DFA) (Rosenbaum and Ru-
bin, 1983). Even though the two types of methods give identical results, the limited
dependent variable model estimated through a logistic/probit regression is more
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favoured. The problem with DFA is that it requires stringent assumptions of normal-
ity, which are usually violated in a multivariate setting where qualitative variables
are among the explanatory variables (See Press and Wilson, 1978, for details). For
this reason, many prefer to use the logit or probit regression to predict the propensity
scores as I do here.
A crucial step in estimating the p-score using the logit or probit model is the
decision on which covariates to use (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). As already dis-
cussed, one of the assumptions to be satisfied before using the PSM method is uncon-
foundedness, which requires the outcome variable to be independent of treatment
conditional on the p-score. In this regard, Smith and Todd (2005) have pointed out
that only variables influencing both the participation decision and the outcome vari-
able should be included in the logistic regression. Additionally, no variable should
be included if it is affected by treatment. Hence, one has to rely on either economic
theory, previous research, or knowledge about the institutional settings to determine
these variables (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). For my case, the choice of variables
is based on previous literature on household savings in developing countries (e.g.
Mikesell and Zinser, 1973; Deaton, 1989) and whether the variables affect the po-
tential outcomes. The studies on saving in developing countries have shown that
household saving depends mainly on household composition and wealth. But de-
spite these two variables being found to be an important determinant of saving, they
are not the only variables that explain variation in saving. Browning and Lusardi
(1996) have highlighted that the variation in saving can also depend on age, house-
hold composition, income, education, and wealth. Accordingly, the variables I use
for the propensity score model are: household size, gender of the household head,
proportion of household members with primary education, indicator for ethnicity of
the household head, household income, indicator for marital status of the household
head, indicator for whether the household is a transfer recipient or not, characteristic
of the household dwelling, proportion of household members in informal and farm
employment, and whether the household lives in a district with a major financial
institution such as a bank or microfinance institution. Evidence also indicates that
these variables can affect potential outcomes such as household spending on con-
sumption (Hassan and Babu, 1991); education (Tilak, 2002); food (See Strauss, 1982,
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on how income and household composition affect food expenditure); (See Parker
and Wong, 1997; Rous and Hotchkiss, 2003, on how income and dwelling conditions
can affect health expenditure); asset ownership (See Yamokoski and Keister, 2006,
on determinants of women asset ownership).
Therefore, the general specification of the propensity score model is given as
follows:
P(T = 1|X) = F(ageh, edulevel, hhsize, f emale, totinc, dwell, f arm, in f ormal,
trans f er, ageh2, edulevel2, hhsize2, trans f er ∗ totinc, trans f er ∗ f emale, ethnic, )
(2.6)
To match on the p(X), many different algorithms are available such as the near-
est neighbour, calliper and radius, stratification and interval, kernel and local linear,
and inverse probability weighting. Making a choice on which matching algorithm
to use is still not clear-cut (Huber et al., 2013). Here I use the kernel method (de-
tails of this method can be found in Heckman et al. (1998)) for two reasons: Firstly,
it is a non-parametric method; hence, does not impose any functional form restric-
tions. Secondly, unlike the first three methods, it uses data on the entire individuals
in the control group to construct the counterfactual. For the kernel method, treated
units are matched with control units based on weighs that is inversely proportional
to the distance between their propensity scores. Thus, control units whose propen-
sity scores are closer to the treated units get more weight than those with distant
propensity scores from the treated units. There are several kernel-based matching
methods (See Frölich, 2004), but I used the kernel ridge regression (KRM) with bias
adjustment method. According to Huber et al. (2013) KRM has superior finite sam-
ple properties than other kernel regression methods and Abadie and Imbens (2011)
have shown that bias-adjusted matching estimators outperform simple matching or
regression estimators. Even though I use the kernel algorithm, as recommended in
the literature, I do a robustness check of the results against the use of alternative
matching algorithms.
A major concern when using PSM to estimate treatment effect is the failure to
account for all relevant covariates; particularly, covariates that cannot be observed.
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Since the central assumption of matching methods is that selection is due to ob-
served covariates and conditional on these covariates treatment is as good as ran-
dom, failure to account for relevant covariates could bias treatment effects, and PSM
is not robust against such "hidden bias" (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). In this re-
gard, it is a useful exercise to check the extent to which the impact estimates of a
PSM are sensitive to the existence of unobserved confounders. A common way of
doing this is the construction of the so-called Rosenbaum bounds, which is an idea
introduced by Rosenbaum (2002). It involves the introduction of some hidden bias
into the selection process and assessing how strong; such bias has to be to influence
the unbiasedness of the matching estimate (Rosenbaum and Silber, 2009). Given that
the approach is practically effortless to implement, I use it here to test the sensitivity
of the PSM estimates to unobserved confounders.
DR Approach
The problem in using the propensity score to estimate the treatment effects is that
the estimator is biased if the treatment assignment model (i.e. the p-score model) or
even the outcome model is not correctly specified. Thus, when one is not sure if the
treatment model is correctly specified, usually the case in a parametric specification
of the model, then, it is desirable to use an estimator that is robust to such misspecifi-
cation; hence, the rationale behind the popularity of the DR estimator. Such estima-
tors remain consistent when either the model of the potential outcome or treatment
assignment is misspecified (Bang and Robins, 2005). Therefore, the model is doubly
robust because it requires either the outcome model or the treatment model to be
correctly specified and not both (Wooldridge, 2010, p. 930). In this regard, the dou-
bly robust estimator offers the researcher the opportunity to address the problem of
model misspecification partially.
In applying the DR method, I follow the approach of Wooldridge (2007). Sup-
pose a model of the potential outcome is, respectively, E{Y(1)|X} and E{Y(0)|X}
for treated and untreated units, and E(D = 1|X) = p(X) is a model of treatment
mechanism. Wooldridge (2007) indicates that the estimand of treatment here can be
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represented as:
ATTDR =
{
E
[DY(1)
p(X)
|X, T = 1
]
− E
[ (1− D)
1− p(X)Y(0)|X, T = 0
]}
(2.7)
The ATTDR can be estimated using a two-step approach Wooldridge (2010). In the
first step, one estimates the treatment model to get the p-scores, and in the second
step, a weighted regression is done to estimate the outcome model where the inverse
p-scores are used as weights. Wooldridge (2007) provides the proofs that using such
an approach produces a doubly robust estimator; (See Wooldridge, 2010, for detail
coverage). Therefore, I gauge the robustness of the propensity score estimates using
the doubly robust estimator.
2.4 Data and Sample Characteristics
Gambia is one of the smallest and poorest countries in mainland Africa. With a
population of about 2 million and a GDP per capita of $473 (World Bank, 2016), it
is certainly among the 20 poorest nations of the world. Like in many developing
countries, poverty in Gambia continues to be a rural phenomenon; more than 70 per
cent of the rural population falls below the international poverty line.
The data I used came from Gambia’s third IHS that was conducted by Gambia
Bureau of Statistics (from here GBoS) between May 2015 and April 2016. The IHS
is among series of household surveys regularly (usually with a five to six years in-
terval) performed by GBoS in collaboration with its international partners such as
the World Bank, United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and United Na-
tions Children’s Fund (UNICEF). The carrying out of household surveys in Gambia
started in 1989, but the first IHS was conducted in 2003/04 and the second in 2010
(GBOS, 2017). The primary purpose of the third IHS is to collect data on household
poverty and vulnerability in Gambia to encourage evidence-based policy making
and also to monitor the country’s progress towards the attainment of her develop-
ment goals (GBOS, 2017). As a result, richer data on households was collected in
this survey round than any of the previous series. Also, the latest IHS also covered
more households relative to last household surveys; for instance, the IHS 2003/04
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and 2010 included only about 4800 households while this IHS involve over 13,000
households.
As a sampling frame, the survey used Gambia Population and Housing Census
2013; hence, all residential households in Gambia were eligible to participate in the
survey. Gambia has 8 local government areas that are divided into 38 districts and
two municipalities. In collecting census data, districts are divided into clusters of
settlements referred to as enumeration areas (EAs) that are classified as either rural
or urban. In sampling households for this survey, a multi-stage sampling design
was implemented wherein EAs were used as primary sampling units. Hence, in the
first sampling stage, 667 EAs were randomly selected, and in the second stage, 20
households from each EA are randomly chosen from a list of all households in the
EA for interviews. A total number of 13,340 households were selected for the sur-
vey. However, due to nonresponses, only 13,281 households were successfully inter-
viewed. The survey constituted four modules: (1) Household and individual level
questionnaire that collected information on socio-economic indicators at both levels;
(2) Consumption questionnaire that collected data on household consumption; (3)
Price questionnaire that collected data on food prices; (4) Community questionnaire
that collected data on community indicators. The latter was, however, administered
to just a selected number of communities. In this study, I use data mainly from mod-
ule 1, 2, and 3. However, the variables used in this study are primarily derived from
module 1 and 2.
Among the indicators used, it is important to briefly describe how I derive the
five outcome variables( i.e. total expenditure, education expenditure, food expendi-
ture, health expenditure, and durable asset ownership) from the data. For the other
variables, a brief description of each is provided in Table 2.1. Total expenditure is the
sum of household spending on food and nonfood expenditure. Education expendi-
ture constitutes household spending on education of members enrolled in schools in
the last academic year prior to the survey; thus, in accordance with UNESCO guide-
lines, these include spending on items such as school fees; purchased of uniforms,
textbooks, and examination fees; and payment for ancillary services such as fares to
schools. Health expenditure captures household out-of-pocket spending on health-
care. It includes items such as spending on consultations, dental fees, injections, lab
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TABLE 2.1: Definition of Variables
Variable Description
Outcome variable
Total expenditure Monthly total per capita expenditure (in GMD)
Education expenditure Monthly education per capita expenditure (in GMD)
Food expenditure Monthly food per capita expenditure (in GMD)
Health expenditure Monthly health per capita expenditure (in GMD)
Durable asset Number of durable assets own by a household
Observed covariates
Household size Total number of people in a household
Ethnicity Ethnicity of the household head
Farm Proportion of household members who are employed as a farmer
Self-employed Proportion of household member who are self-employed
Married Proportion of household members who are married
Marital status Marital status of the household head (1=married, 0=otherwise)
Income Total income of the household
School Proportion of household members who have ever attended school
Education level Proportion of household members with at least 8 years of formal education
Transfer Households has received a transfer from a relative in the past 12 months (1=true, 0=otherwise)
Age Age of the household head in number of years
Dwell Type of household dwelling
noalign (1= 1 with 1 HH ; 2= > 1 with > 1 HH; 3 = > 1 with 1 HH; 9 = Others
District_bank District has a formal financial institution provider
Definition of all variables that used in the anaylsis. Note: HH = Houshold
fees, scanning, X-ray, delivery, immunisation, drugs, and other charges. Durable as-
sets ownership is the sum of durable assets owned by each household. The list of
durable assets includes three main types of assets: home furniture, home appliances,
and means of transport. Except for durable asset ownership, all the outcome vari-
ables are expressed in per capita terms using household size. However, monthly
per capita food expenditure is shown in terms of adult equivalent units; this is so
because adult equivalent scales are a more accurate reflection of divergence in food
demand at the household level. The adult equivalent scales used were taken from
the 1998 national poverty survey report by Government of The Gambia (1998).
Descriptions of all the variables and summary statistics are, respectively, re-
ported in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2. Note that all the continuous variables reported in
the table are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile; this was done to get rid of out-
lier observations. The mean monthly per capita total expenditure for all households
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in the sample is about GMD 2063 (about $43), and it is higher (20 per cent more) for
households with access to saving than those without access to formal saving. For
monthly per capita expenditure on food, it is also higher for treated households (i.e.
those with access to formal saving) than untreated households (i.e. those without
access to formal saving); in particular, the latter group spends on average about 41
per cent less on food. In the pooled sample, monthly per capita spending on food
averages GMD 321 (about $7) per month. Such low levels of monthly per capita food
expenditure in the sample corroborate the high degree of poverty in Gambia. In fact,
by the national food poverty line of about GMD 983 (about $21), the estimations of
the poverty rate indicate that about 42 per cent of households in the sample live in
extreme poverty; in line with the national food poverty rate of about 48.6 per cent.
Regarding durable asset ownership, households in the treatment group hold al-
most twice more durable assets than those in the comparison group. The result for
the pooled sample shows that on average households own more than five durable
assets. It can also be seen that households that are treated tend, on average, to spend
more on education than those not treated. The median annual per capita education
expenditure (not reported) in the pooled sample is about GMD 402 (about $ 8.4),
which indicates that education spending is in general low; this is a stylized fact in
developing countries. According to Banerjee and Duflo (2007), one possible expla-
nation is that most poor households in these places send their kids to public schools
and these do not ask for fees.
As shown in the last column of the table, all the differences in means for the
outcome variables, except for monthly per capita total expenditure, are statistically
different from zero. However, ascribing these differences to differences in formal
saving ownership can be misleading at this point; as will be discussed shortly (but
as seen in the Table 2.2) observed characteristics are also markedly different between
the two groups. So, unless I account for these differences, I cannot attribute the dif-
ferences in outcome between the two groups to participate in formal saving inter-
ventions.
For the observed covariates, Table 2.2 reports that untreated households are big-
ger in size than treated households; the average household size in the pooled sam-
ple is 8 members. Education level is also different in the two groups; the number of
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TABLE 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Comparison Treatment Pooled Difference
Mean Mean Mean mean
& sd & sd & sd & sd
Total expenditure 2014.3 2426.0 2062.5 -411.7
(44283.2) (2406.2) (41617.0) (1126.1)
Education expenditure 609.8 1320.2 702.5 -710.4***
(1166.7) (2213.2) (1370.8) (44.7)
Food expenditure 306.6 431.2 321.2 -124.6***
(235.9) (376.8) (259.6) (6.9)
Health expenditure 7.4 14.3 8.2 -6.9***
(41.38) (99.94) (51.88) (1.396)
Durable asset 5.0 8.2 5.4 -3.2***
(2.870) (3.790) (3.164) (0.081)
Household size 8.027 7.512 7.966 0.514***
(5.272) (5.660) (5.322) (0.143)
Ethnicity 2.523 2.592 2.534 -0.068
(1.920) (1.987) (1.931) (0.108)
Farm 0.187 0.128 0.180 0.059***
(0.269) (0.237) (0.266) (0.007)
Self-employed 0.0133 0.0157 0.0136 -0.0020
(0.0682) (0.0752) (0.0690) (0.002)
Married (proportion) 0.371 0.393 0.373 -0.022***
(0.205) (0.252) (0.212) (0.006)
Marital status (household head) 2.258 2.086 2.232 0.171**
(1.165) (0.991) (1.143) (0.061)
Household total income 1034.1 2246.4 1176.0 -1212.3***
(2930.6) (4630.5) (3200.5) (86.0)
School 0.376 0.644 0.407 -0.268***
(0.484) (0.479) (0.491) (0.013)
Education level 5.453 3.594 5.234 1.859***
(4.652) (4.070) (4.626) (0.124)
Transfer 0.376 0.442 0.384 -0.066***
(0.484) (0.497) (0.486) (0.013)
Age 44.53 41.89 44.14 2.64***
(14.81) (13.24) (14.62) (0.78)
N 11,717 1,564 13281
Descriptive statistics of outcome and observed characteristics. Reported under the
columns are the means and standard deviation of the variables for household with
access to formal saving accounts (treatment) and households without access to for-
mal saving accounts (comparison) and all households (pooled). Test statistics from
the test of mean difference between the two groups is reported in the last column.
Note: reported in parenthesis are the standard deviations; all continuous variables
were winsorized at the 99th percent level; *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
household members that have completed primary education is lower for households
in the treated sample than the comparison sample. This is a bit surprising given that
the latter group spends less on education per person than the former. However,
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TABLE 2.3: Poverty and Inequality Indicators
Indicator Comparison Treatment Population
Poverty rate 0.528 0.290 0.478
SST index 0.418 0.235 0.385
Gini index 0.458 0.381 0.448
Level of poverty and inquality in the two groups. Note: household weights were used; SST =
Sen, Shorrocks and Thon measure of poverty which is the weighted sum of the poverty gap. All
measures are based on an absolute poverty line of 1503 Gambian Dalasis.
given that primary and secondary education in Gambia (for public schools) is free,
one possible explanation could be that households in the treated group have more
members in higher education, where fees can be quite expensive. For households
in both the treated and non-treated sample, many are employed in the agricultural
sector as farmers; the average proportion of household members in farm-related
employment is 18 per cent in the pooled sample. Although more households in the
treated sample are formally employed (i.e. in wage employment or self-employed),
in general, very few household members in the sample are formally employed.
Given that transfers from family members can be an essential driver of house-
hold saving, an indicator variable for transfer received is also reported. The propor-
tion of households who said to have received a transfer is less in the comparison
sample than in the treatment sample. The average percentage of households in both
samples who reported to have received a transfer is more than 30 per cent.
Regarding orthogonality of the observed covariates in the two groups, the last
column of the Table 2.2 shows that except for three indicators (monthly per capita
total expenditure, ethnicity of the head, the proportion of self-employed household
members) all the observed covariates are highly significantly different in the two
groups. Hence, any determination of causal impact that involves comparing these
groups and where the average outcome of the untreated group serves as a proxy
for the counterfactual outcome of the treated group must account for differences in
observed characteristic, as this might be an indication of selection bias. The methods
I used to address this issue are described in the previous section.
In the discussions above, I briefly stated that the low food monthly per capita
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expenditure could be due to the widespread nature of poverty in Gambia and by ex-
tension in the two groups. Thus, here I provide more detail information on the kind
of poverty and inequality in the two groups. In this regards, in Table 2.3 I report three
indicators that capture poverty and inequality: poverty headcount index, Gini index,
and Sen, Shorrock and Thon (SST) poverty index. These indicators were computed
using the data on household consumption. Accordingly, as poverty line, I used the
national absolute poverty line developed by GBoS from the IHS 2015/16 data. GBoS
constructed the national poverty line using the commonly used cost of basic needs
approach, which measures poverty based on a households’ ability to afford the cost
of basic needs such as daily calorie needs plus clothing and shelter (See Ravallion,
1998, for details). Based on this approach household absolute poverty line in Gam-
bia is set at 1503 Gambia dalasis (GMD) per month. Therefore, using this poverty
line Table 2.3 shows that the poverty rate is higher for households without access
to formal saving accounts than it is for households with access to such accounts.
The Gini index, which measures inequality, is also higher for the comparison group
(i.e. households with a formal saving product); hence, inequality is lower for the
latter group. The SST index, which captures the intensity of poverty by combining
the first two measures plus the poverty gap, shows that poverty is more intensive
for households without ownership of regular accounts. A measure of the poverty
depth using the poverty gap, shown in Figure 2.1, indicate that poverty depth is
higher for households without formal financial resources than it is for households
with such resources. Therefore, even though poverty and inequality are pervasive
in both groups they are higher for households who do not own a saving account;
this could be an indication that poverty might be a reason for low ownership of
regular accounts by most households in Gambia. This result is in line with the ev-
idence globally that many adults do not own accounts because of lack of a stable
income source (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2017). Note that since I have not controlled for
differences in covariates, I am talking in terms of correlations only.
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FIGURE 2.1: Depth of Poverty
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Figure shows the depth of poverty in the treatment and comparison and treatment group. The poverty
depth is measured using the poverty gap, which gives the ratio by which the mean income of the poor
is below the poverty line. The poverty line is set at the national absolute poverty line of GMD 1503.
2.5 Empirical Results and Discussion
The results from the treatment effect estimations - for both the propensity score
model and the doubly robust model - are reported in Table 2.7 under ATTPSM and
ATTDR respectively. However, before the treatment effects are estimated, one has
first to specify and estimate a propensity score model. To this effect, I used a logistic
model for predicting the likelihood of a household to own a formal saving account
given the household’s observed characteristics mentioned in 2.3.1. The outcome of
the estimation is reported in Table 2.4. The likelihood ratio chi-square test statistics
of 357.93 with a p-value of 0.000, not reported in the table, indicate that the observed
covariates I used does well in predicting the probability of owning a saving account.
Moreover, all the covariates except education level have the expected effect on the
probability of owning a regular saving account; as expected household size, income,
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TABLE 2.4: Propensity Score for Savings Ownership
Coefficient Std. Error Z-Statistic
HHsize 0.394*** 0.0831 4.74
HHsize*HHsize -0.009 0.0048 -1.93
Age 0.035 0.0279 1.26
Age*Age -0.000 0.0003 -1.20
Ethnicity -0.033 0.0360 -0.92
Tranfer*Female -0.082 0.3389 -0.24
Edulevel -0.695*** 0.0761 -9.14
Dwell 0.069 0.0668 1.04
Female -0.594 0.3349 -1.77
Female*Ethnicity 0.061 0.0756 0.81
Transfer -0.203 0.2144 -0.94
Edulevel*Edulevel 0.026*** 0.0055 4.63
District_Bank 0.210 0.1348 1.56
LogIncome 0.289** 0.1108 2.61
Farm -0.202 0.2468 -0.82
Informal -0.187 0.5376 -0.35
Income 0.000 0.0000 0.73
Transfer*Income 0.000* 0.0000 2.06
Constant -4.866*** 0.9632 -5.05
Psedo R2 0.174
Estimation result of the propensity score model. Note: Std. error = Standard errors of the co-
efficients; Z-Statistic = Statistics from the standard normal distribution; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01,
***p < 0.001
living in district with a formal bank all have a positive effect on the predicted prob-
ability of owning regular saving account.
Despite briefly describing the estimates from the logistic model, these estimates
are in themselves not very important (Lee, 2013). So what is useful is the extent to
which they help in the achievement of covariate balance. Checking for covariate
balance is therefore very crucial in such applications. This can be done both before
matching and after matching, and several approaches have been suggested (See Lee,
2013, for details). I used the standard differences test and variance ratio approach
that was first suggested in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) and commonly used in the
literature. The results of the balance checks are reported, respectively, for PSM and
DR in Table 2.5 and 2.6. Regarding the standard difference, the recommendation (See
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985, for details) is that it should not be more than 20% (in
absolute terms) as anything above this is considered a large difference that signals
covariate imbalance. Ideally, however, a standard difference of less 10% is usually
preferred. For the variance ratio, it is recommended that its values should lie be-
tween 0.5 and 2. Given these recommended values, the balance test results in table
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TABLE 2.5: Balancing Results (PSM-Kernel Ridge Regression)
Standard Differences & Variance Ratios
Variable Standard Diff. Variance Ratios
Raw Matched Raw Matched
Age -0.215 0.005 0.827 0.990
Hhsize -0.330 0.033 0.913 0.967
Edulevel -0.680 0.011 0.635 1.104
Female -0.160 0.015 0.776 1.028
Totinc 0.791 0.048 2.071 1.002
Dwell 0.074 0.047 1.621 1.280
Farm -0.263 -0.001 0.758 1.078
Informal 0.037 0.029 1.394 0.946
Transfer 0.003 0.034 1.003 1.017
Agesq -0.215 0.005 0.827 0.990
Hhsize*hhsize -0.227 -0.023 0.992 1.046
Edulevel*edulevel -0.378 .020 0.897 1.238
Transfer*totinc 0.437 0.067 3.493 1.231
Transfer*female -0.129 0.001 0.739 1.002
2.Ethnicity -0.371 0 .0253 0.678 1.043
3.Ethnicity 0.071 -0.009 1.173 0.981
4.Ethnicity 0.065 -0.020 1.218 0.953
5.Ethnicity -0.012 -0.008 0.952 0.967
6.Ethnicity 0.075 0.019 1.423 1.075
7.Ethnicity 0.097 0.005 3.050 1.083
8.Ethnicity 0.128 0.066 2.722 1.612
9.Ethnicity -0.042 0.034 0.696 1.505
10.Ethnicity -0.060 -0.020 0.506 0.762
Results from the balancing test of observed covariates from the kernel ridge regression model.
Notes: Raw = unmatched sample and Matched = matched sample; Agesq =Age square; HHsize =
Household size; Totinc = Total income; Edulevel = Education Level; Standard Diff. = standardized
difference. The standardized difference and the variance ratios are based on Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1985). Ideally, the standardized difference of covariates between the two groups shouldn’t be
above 20% (absolute value) and variance ratio between 0.5 and 2 is desired. The two statistics are
reported for the unmatched and matched sample.
2.5 and 2.6 show that the propensity scores (in both the matching model and the
robust double model) does well in balancing the covariates among the two groups.
Specifically, before matching only a few indicators (proportion of household in infor-
mal employment, the dwelling type of the household, and whether the household is
a transfer recipient ) have a standardise difference below 10%; in fact, most of them
are above 20%. However, after matching, all the covariates have now a standard-
ised mean difference of less than 10%. A similar observation can be made from the
variance ratio estimates. In particular, even for the covariates with variance ratios
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FIGURE 2.2: Cumulative Plot of Propensity Scores
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Figure shows cumulative probability plots of the p-scores before matching (Raw)
and after matching (Matched). Note: ATT = Average Treatment Effects. The vertical
axis reports the probability that the p-score is less than or equal to a given p-score.
outside the 0.5-2 range, their variance ratios fall within the recommended range af-
ter matching. Therefore, taking together the results here indicate that the propensity
scores produce a satisfactory balance. This can also clearly be seen in the cumu-
lative plots in Figure 2.2; the distribution of the propensity scores get similar after
matching than before matching.
After getting a satisfactory balance, next, I check for the degree of overlap of
propensity scores in the two groups. This is shown in Figure 2.3. Despite the de-
gree of overlap being stronger at lower propensity scores than higher propensity
scores, overall the figure shows that the overlap in propensity scores between the
two groups is fairly good; i.e. for all the propensity scores, there are households in
both the comparison and treatment group. This ensures that for every household
that owns a formal saving account I can find a household without a formal saving
account that it can be compared to via similarity in observable characteristics. Given
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TABLE 2.6: Balancing Results (DR)
Standard Difference & Variance Ratios
Variable Standard Diffs Variance ratios
Variable Raw Weighted Raw Weighted
Age -0.215 0.011 0.827 0.922
HHsize -0.330 -0.005 0.913 0.981
Edulevel -0.680 0.009 0.635 0.971
Female -0.160 0.023 0.776 1.044
Farm -0.263 0.031 0.758 1.132
Informal 0.037 0.023 1.394 1.065
Transfer 0.003 -0.059 1.003 0.979
Totinc 0.792 -0.049 2.071 0.901
Agesq -0.215 0.008 0.827 0.989
Dwell 0.074 -0.029 1.620 0.763
Hhsize*hhsize -0.227 -0.005 0.818 0.933
Edulevel*edulevel -0.378 0.014 0.489 0.721
Transfer*totinc 0.438 0.031 3.493 0.996
Transfer*female -0.130 0.016 0.739 1.040
2.Ethnicity -0.371 .0253 0.678 1.043
3.Ethnicity 0.071 -0.009 1.173 0.981
4.Ethnicity 0.065 -0.020 1.218 0.953
5.Ethnicity -0.012 -0.008 0.952 0.967
6.Ethnicity 0.075 0.019 1.423 1.075
7.Ethnicity 0.097 0.005 3.050 1.083
8.Ethnicity 0.128 0.066 2.722 1.612
9.Ethnicity -0.042 0.034 0.696 1.505
10.Ethnicity -0.060 -0.020 0.506 0.762
Results from the balancing test of observed covariates from the doubly robust model estimated us-
ing the inverse probability weighting regression adjustment estimator. Notes: Raw = unmatched
sample and Matched = matched sample; Agesq =Age square; HHsize = Household size; Totinc =
Total income; Edulevel = Education Level; Standard Diff. = standardized difference. The stan-
dardized difference and the variance ratios are based on Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). Ideally,
the standardized difference of covariates between the two groups shouldn’t be above 20% (abso-
lute value) and variance ratio between 0.5 and 2 is desired. The two statistics are reported for the
unmatched and matched sample.
that the overlap graph was done in the region of common support, the figure shows
that the distribution of the propensity scores in the region of common support ap-
pears good enough; this is necessary to avoid the problem of using poor matches
when estimating the treatment effects. So next I discuss the treatment effect estima-
tion results.
As mentioned in section 2.3.1, I used kernel ridge regression algorithm with
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FIGURE 2.3: Overlap Graph of the Propensity Scores in Matched Sam-
ple
19
14
.2
5
9.
5
4.
75
0
4.
75
9.
5
14
.2
5
19
Pe
rc
en
t 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
propensity score
comparison treatment
Figure is a Barchat plot of the p-scores for the comparison and treatment group. The height of a bar
gives the percentage of households with p-scores equivalent to p-score of that bar.
biased-adjustment to estimate the treatment effects via PSM. Like any kernel based-
method, two crucial choices have to be made: a choice of what type of kernel to use
and a decision regarding the smoothing term - i.e. bandwidth. I used the Epanech-
nikov kernel and allowed the bandwidth to be determined via the pair-matching
approach of Huber et al. (2013). In a ridge regression, one has also to set the ridge
term. As recommended by Huber et al. (2013), I set this term at 0.3125. Further-
more, I used bootstrapping to estimate the standard errors and set the number of
replications at 1000; additionally, standard errors were clustered at the EA level. The
estimations were done in STATA using the KMATCH command of Jann (2017). The
results from this exercise are reported in row 2 of Table 2.7. The second row of the
table contains the results from the DR estimation algorithm. All the impact estimates
are in terms of average treatment effect on the treated (ATT).
In Table 2.7, the PSM estimates show that ownership of a formal saving account
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TABLE 2.7: Treatment Effects
Total Expenditure Education Food Health Durable Assets
ATTPSM 513.03*** 443.05*** 75.93*** 1.91 1.13***
(95.885) (124.744) ( 24.231) (1.656) (0.298)
ATTDR 501.10*** 369.42*** 70.02*** 1.00 1.06***
(92.798) (120.945) (22.141) (1.482) (0.297)
comparison group
Mean 2014.3 609.8 306.6 7.4 5.0
Std. Dev 44283.2 1166.7 235.9 41.38 2.870
Estimation results on the Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) from the Propen-
sity Score Model (PSM) and Doubly Robust (DR) Model. Notes: ATTPSM = estimates of
ATT from the PSM model; ATTDR = estimates of ATT from the DR model; *p < 0.10,
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Reported in parenthesis are: For ATTPSM, the bootstrap stan-
dard errors with 1000 replications and clustered at the EA level; For ATTDR, the cluster
(clustering at the EA level) robust standard errors. We use clustering to adjust for the fact
that the data was collected using cluster random sampling where clustering occurred at
the EA level. The ridge term for the kernel matching is set at 0.3125 and bandwidth is
determined via pair-matching.
has a positive and significant impact on household monthly per capita total expendi-
ture. In particular, households that have access to a saving spend about 513 dalasis
1 more than those that do not have access to a formal saving account. Thus, for-
mal saving increases monthly per capita total household spending by about 25%. In
terms of standard deviations, the effect is just 0.012, which is very small; this is due
to the high variability of total expenditure on households in the comparison group.
It was due to this reason that all continuous variables were winsorized at the 1st
and 99th percentile level before using them in the treatment effect estimation. An
estimate of the impact of 501 for total expenditure in row 2, which is also statistically
significant, indicates that the doubly robust estimate is indeed similar to the kernel
estimate.
Regarding annual per capita household education expenditure, the PSM esti-
mate in Table 2.7 shows that access to formal means of saving by households in-
creases monthly per capita household expenditure by about 73% - about 0.38 stan-
dard deviation, which seems significant. However, in terms of Cohen’s d (See Co-
hen, 1992) can be considered a medium size effect, which is the highest impact of
1The dalasis to dollar rate was about 47 at the time of writing
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saving I find for the outcomes studied. The reason why formal saving account own-
ership leads to such a high impact on education than the other household indicators
is not clear-cut. But I think this could be explained by the fact that households hold
savings accounts mainly to set funds aside for footing education bills. However,
I do not have enough information in the data to test for this; hence, this explana-
tion remains a loose one. A similar causal impact estimate on education is obtained
when the DR procedure is employed; the magnitude of the impact estimates are
quite the same in the two approaches and both I get highly statistical significant im-
pact estimate for per capita education spending. This is an indication that the impact
estimate for education spending is robust across different specifications of the ATT.
The PSM estimates also show that the causal impact of access to formal saving on
the household monthly per capita food expenditure is positive and statistically sig-
nificant. In particular, access to formal means of saving by a household increases the
household monthly per capita spending on food by about 0.32 standard deviations.
Again the DR estimate of the same impact is, in magnitude, very close to the PSM
estimate and is statistically significant, which indicates that the effect I find is robust
against alternative estimation methods.
For health expenditure, the causal impact is positive implying that access to sav-
ing increases household monthly per capita health expenditure. However, unlike
the other outcomes already discussed it is both economically and statistically in-
significant. The low economic size of the estimate can be attributed to the fact that
self-reported household spending on health services in the dataset is generally low;
the percentage share of household health expenditure in total household consump-
tion is about 1%. In low-income countries like Gambia, many households access
health care through public health facilities and the fees charged in these places are
very minimal. As a result, direct out-of-pocket expenditures on health services are
very low. In this regard, Gambia does not seem to face the problem of catastrophic
health expenditure that characterises health care access in some developing coun-
tries (World Health Organization and Others, 2005). However, the low levels of pri-
vate health financing plus little public funding (about just 11% of GDP) culminate to
the low level of health care delivery in the country; health care services in Gambia
is mostly (about 70% ) financed via donor assistance (Government of The Gambia,
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TABLE 2.8: Treatment Effects: Other Matching Algorithms
Total Expenditure Education Food Health Durable Assets
ATTNNM(1) 435.27*** 377.76*** 77.62*** 1.50 1.180***
(133.311) (170.640) (30.847) (2.162) (0.347)
ATTNNM(4) 536.41*** 391.59*** 69.35*** 0.12 1.09***
(104.576) (144.398) (25.793) (1.780) (0.3305)
ATTRadius 546.60*** 393.67*** 67.88*** 0.20 1.09***
(103.388) (137.808) (24.754 ) 1.842 0.299
Estimation results on Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) for the out-
come variables in the columns estimated using other matching algorithms: Near-
est Neigbor Matching using a single neighbor (ATTNNM(1)); Nearest Neighbor
Matching using 4 neighbors (ATTNNM(4)); Caliper or Radius matching (ATTRadius)
. Notes: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; Reported in parenthesis are the boot-
strap standard errors with 1000 replications and clustered at the EA level; For the
radius matching, we set the caliper at 0.019.
2007).
Lastly, the results in Table 2.7 indicate that the causal impact of access to formal
saving on household ownership of durable assets is positive and statistically signifi-
cant. Specifically, the PSM estimate shows that household ownership of formal sav-
ing account causes about 21% increase in the number of durable assets ownership.
Also, the estimation of the treatment effect using the DR gives about the same effect
size of the impact (i.e. about 0.39 standard deviation) as the PSM; hence, similarly
the treatment effect for durable assets ownership is robust to alternative treatment
effect estimation methods.
For further robustness check, I also estimated the treatment effects using other
matching algorithms such as nearest neighbour matching and calliper matching.
The results from this exercise are summarised in Table 2.8. For the nearest neigh-
bour matching, I made a distinction between using a single nearest neighbour in
the treatment effect estimation and using four nearest neighbours in the treatment
effect estimation. When carrying out the radius matching, I follow the approach of
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) to set the calliper at 0.019. The estimates produced
using these alternative algorithms of carrying out the PSM are generally quite sim-
ilar to those obtained when the kernel method is used; just the magnitude of some
of the impacts (e.g. total expenditure in NN(1) ) are a bit different from the kernel
estimates. Importantly, however, the statistical significance of all the impacts remain
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TABLE 2.9: Sensitivity Analysis
Rosenbaum Bounds
Outcome variable Significance level Γ = 1.0 Γ = 1.1 Γ = 1.2 Γ = 1.3 Γ = 1.4 Γ = 1.5
Total expenditure p+ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0005 0.0029
p− 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Education p+ 0.0268 0.0737 0.1559 0.2706 0.4046 0.5408
p− 0.0268 0.0078 0.0020 0.0005 0.0001 0.0000
Food p+ 0.0013 0.0125 0.0611 0.1822 0.3755 .5916
p− 0.0013 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Asset ownership p+ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0032 0.0158 0.0537
p− 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sensitivity analysis to test for the effects of unobserved covariates using Rosenbaum Bounds.
The significance level is the upper (p+ =) and lower (p− =) bound p-values for each level of
Γ, which measures the odd ratio of owning a formal saving account for units with the same
values of the observed covariates under hidden bias; it starts from 1.0 (%0 of hidden bias) to 1.5
(50% of hidden bias). Note: Health expenditure is omitted from table because it was found to be
statistically insignificantly impacted by savings ownership.
unchanged regardless of the matching algorithm used. In light of this, I argue that
the estimates I find here are robust both to alternative estimators and to different
matching algorithms.
The output from the sensitivity analysis using the Rosenbaum (2002) approach
are reported in Table 2.9. The Rosenbaum bounds were computed using a gamma
(odd ratio of owning a saving account for units with the same values of the ob-
served covariates) that ranges from 1 (no heterogeneity or hidden bias, i.e. treated
and comparison units have the same likelihood of owning a saving account given
their observed covariates) to a maximum of 2 (i.e. units with the same value of ob-
served covariates could have up to 200% difference in their likelihood of owning an
account due to unobserved confounders or hidden bias with a 0.1 increase). For each
value of gamma, two levels of significance (p-values) are reported that are based on
McNemar test: an upper bound and a lower bound level of significance.The p-values
are reported in column 2 of Table 2.9. Given that for some of the outcomes the up-
per bound level of significance gets higher than the standard level of 5% at gamma
higher than 1.5, reported in Table 2.9 are the results obtained for gamma 1 - 1.5.
The results show that the impact estimate of total expenditure remain statisti-
cally significant even if hidden bias introduces a heterogeneity of about 50% in the
odd ratio of owning a formal saving account for units with the same values of the
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observed covariates used for the matching. This implies that a mild hidden bias is
not sufficient to undermine the results obtained. However, for the impact estimate
on annual per capita education spending, it is sensitive to the mild difference in un-
observed covariates in that even with a gamma of 1.1 the upper bound p-value is
higher than the conventional level of 5%; hence, becoming insignificant at this level.
The estimate of per capita food spending, on the other hand, is slightly less sensitive
to hidden bias than per capita education spending as its upper bound of significance
remain significant at a gamma of 1.1. However, it also becomes insignificant at 5%
when gamma increases to 1.2 even though it is still significant at 10%. For asset own-
ership the results show that heterogeneity has to be about 60% high for the effects
I find for this indicator to be statistically insignificant at the 10% level; at the con-
vention significance level, even 40% of heterogeneity or hidden bias does not affect
the significance of its impact estimates. Hence, broadly speaking the two impact
estimates that appear to be robust to relaxing the assumption that all relevant unob-
served covariates are also balanced are per capita expenditure and asset ownership.
Having said that it is important to note that the sensitivity analysis results indicate
just what happened in the worse case scenario. Therefore, the results they provide
should be interpreted with care.
2.6 Conclusion
In this study, I provide evidence on the impact of ownership of formal saving ac-
counts on household welfare in Gambia using a recently collected representative
household survey and causal inference methods for observational studies. These
rigorous techniques allow me to get a consistent estimate of the causal impact of
access to formal financial products like savings on households wellbeing. I find ev-
idence that in Gambia access to formal means of savings by households causes an
increase in household well-being. In particular, using propensity score matching
with kernel ridge regression, I find that household ownership of a formal saving
product leads to an increase in total household spending by about 25%. It also in-
creases the annual education spending of a household by about 73% as well as food
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expenditure spending by about 25%, and household ownership of durable assets by
21%.
To check if the estimates from the propensity score model are robust to alterna-
tive specification of the treatment effects, I also estimated the treatment effects using
a doubly robust method. Generally, the results from the doubly robust model are
similar to those of the propensity score model - both in terms of magnitude and sta-
tistical significant. Hence, I conclude that the estimates I find using the propensity
score model with kernel estimation method are robust to alternative specifications
of the treatment effect model. Furthermore, I also checked whether estimates from
the propensity score model are robust to alternative matching algorithms and I find
evidence that the estimates remain somewhat the same irrespective of the matching
algorithm used. Lastly, I also checked if the ratings are sensitive to the problem of
hidden bias and I obtained that while the impact estimate of food expenditure and
asset ownership are not sensitive to mild hidden bias the impact estimate of edu-
cation and food expenditure is susceptible to such bias. In this regard, I postulate
that the impact of saving on total spending and asset ownership provides the most
robust evidence on the effect of saving on household welfare in Gambia.
Therefore, in total, the results I find here indicate that having access to formal ac-
counts can have positive consequences on socio-economic outcomes of households
in Gambia. From a broader perspective, therefore, I support the mounting evidence
from experimental and non-experimental studies that savings promotion can be an
excellent tool to promote socio-economic development in developing countries. For
Gambia in particular, I provide rigorous evidence that ownership of formal savings
accounts enhances household welfare. Thus, savings promotions could be an ideal
tool to promote socio-economic development in the country via financial inclusion
as the latter encourage households to make long-term investments that improve
welfare. Hence, the government should intensify its efforts in promoting broader
financial inclusion via access to more formal means of savings.
The main limitation of the study is that I do not have enough information from
the data to analyse which specific aspects of the saving account ownership motivates
the impact on socioeconomic outcomes revealed by the study. In the case of Gambia,
this is quite important as it will indicate which aspects of savings can be promoted
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for there to be positive impacts on household well-being. Thus, this aspect is some-
thing I leave for future research.
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Appendix B
Additional Tables and Figures
FIGURE B.1: Boxplot of Covariate Balance
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Chapter 3
The Big Five Personality Traits and
Borrowers behaviour: Evidence
from Group-Based Lending in
Gambia
3.1 Introduction
Among the various tools that have been advanced for dealing with poverty by
economists, one that has received significant attention over the years, especially in
developing countries, is the issue of financial inclusion; in particular, the access of
credit services by the poor. Access to credit is necessary because the majority of
the extreme poor in developing countries are dwellers of rural communities. In
these places, there exist very few traditional money lending institutions. The ab-
sence of formal means of credit in areas that are predominantly inhabited by the
poor is due to many factors, among them the fact that poor borrowers lack sufficient
collateral to support their loan applications. Meanwhile, without access to credit
low-income households cannot have access to capital required to finance projects
that can get them out of poverty. It is for this reason that the provision of credit to
the poor via non-conventional means (such as microcredit) is a valuable tool to boost
global efforts to combat poverty and underdevelopment (See for instance Khandker
et al., 1998, on the welfare impacts of microcredit in Bangladesh). Such a notion to
microcredit became popular following the successes of Mohammed Yunus and the
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Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. 1 2
The central idea of microcredit (often also known as micro-lending) is the provi-
sion of credit, in the form of small loans, to low-income earners (mostly the extreme
poor in rural areas in developing countries) some of whom have promising projects
but lack credit access. By the way, the reason why access to credit in many low-
income countries is low is that many of the formal credit providers in these places
find lending to the poor unattractive as many of them are involved with highly risky
activities, thus, with highly variable earnings. Hence, to ensure loans get to those
that can repay, formal lenders impose a lot of stringent conditions that the poor
usually find difficult to satisfy. Consequently, traditional means of credit creation
emerge as a means to fill this void. However, these means of credit creation in ru-
ral areas come with very high interest rates, which makes it difficult for the poor to
borrow and make ends meet. It is against this backdrop that various forms of micro-
lending are viewed as an essential tool for dealing with the problem of credit access
by the poor.
Among the different variants of micro-credit, one that has attracted much atten-
tion over the years is a group and joint liability lending. It has captured the attention
of economists as one of the most promising means to get credit to those without ac-
cess to formal credit (Wydick, 1999). In such schemes, a group gets a loan and all
members of the group are responsible for its repayment; that is all individuals in a
group are jointly liable for a loan. Such a lending program is ideal because it solves
a fundamental problem in credit markets – the bottleneck of distinguishing between
high-risk and low-risk borrowers due to information asymmetries. Besides, it also
minimises the fixed cost associated with small loans (Karlan, 2005). The difficulty
in screening poor borrowers plus lack of collateral and credit history increases the
cost of lending to the poor (Aghion and Gollier, 2000). Group lending can reduce
such cost by transferring the cost of screening and monitory to borrowers them-
selves (Karlan, 2005); usually, borrowers have more information about each other
1As of 2011 the Grameen Bank was providing credit to about 8.3 million people, 97% of who are
women, (Grameen, 2016).
2It is critical to note that despite its successes, there is much suspicion around the ability of the
schemes to lead the way to sustainable economic development. However, the suspicion is mostly on
the programmatic issues of the schemes rather than their rationale, which is providing credit access to
the poor.
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that they can use to ensure each member pays a jointly liable loan. Therefore, group
lending leads to a lower interest rate, which increases loan repayment; as shown by
Varian (1990); Ghatak (1999), this is because lower interest rates bring back high-
quality borrowers into the credit market, which increase repayments. Hence, group
lending enhances loan repayments because joint liability motivates individual mem-
bers of groups to engage in activities like screening (Varian, 1990; Ghatak, 1999) and
monitoring and enforcement (Stiglitz, 1990; Besley and Coate, 1995) that minimize
the incentive to default. Hence, social structures are essential for the success of the
schemes. Accordingly, most of the empirical evidence on group lending and loan
repayment or delinquency (e.g. Wydick, 1999; Hermes et al., 2005; Karlan, 2007; Cas-
sar et al., 2007; Ahlin and Townsend, 2007) focuses on the impact of social capital,
which affects the impact of the highlighted mechanisms, on the performance of the
schemes. This is usually done while controlling for the effect of individual cogni-
tive traits such as income, age, education, religion, among others, which also affect
borrowers behaviour.
However, there has not been much focus on the relevance of non-cognitive traits
on borrowers repayment behaviour. From a broader sense, such a challenge is not
limited to only the study of micro-lending but economics as a whole. In economics,
much of the attempts to characterise individual differences in socioeconomic out-
comes as sources of differences in behaviour have been centred on cognitive traits
(Borghans et al., 2008). Almlund et al. (2011) argued that there exist significant
imbalance in highlighting how cognitive skills might relate to other non-cognitive
traits. This is quite intriguing given that there exists significant evidence in person-
ality psychology that personality traits do affect life outcomes (See Ozer and Benet-
Martinez, 2006, for details). The limited evidence that is available in mainstream
economics is concentrated on the impact of personality trait on the labour market,
education, and financial outcomes. Recently, however, there has been an increase in
the number of studies that analyses how the behaviour of economic actors can be
related to their non-cognitive traits. However, few studies have looked at the effect
of traits on behaviour in other markets like credit markets.
Therefore, the central motivation of this study is to contribute to the filling of
this gap. In particular, the intention is to add to the evidence on the relationship
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between non-cognitive traits and behaviour of borrowers in microcredit markets. I
do this by studying how the dispositional aspects of borrowers affect their repay-
ment behaviour. Thus, the study is based on borrowers participating in an NGO
grouped based microcredit program in Gambia that targets only women.3 The psy-
chological traits are measured using the Five-Factor model (FFM in short), which
is the main instrument used to measure personality traits. In Psychology, there are
shreds of evidence that these traits affect human behaviour. Thus, I study the extent
to which these traits are capable of predicting borrowers default behaviour; default
behaviour is measured through a question in a survey that asks a borrower whether
she has once defaulted on her part of a group loan or not (i.e. delinquency in loan
repayments).
Therefore, this study is broadly related to a study by Karlan et al. (2012) (from
here KMR). In particular, like KMR I also use survey-based measures of personality
traits to study individual default behaviour. However, it differs from these authors
in two ways: Firstly, unlike their study which is based on borrowers that were partic-
ipating in an individual microcredit scheme, this study is based on borrowers partic-
ipating in group lending schemes. Given that the factors that affect behaviour could
be different in the two settings, one expect for the dynamics of the relationship be-
tween traits and behaviour to be also different in the two types of lending schemes.
Secondly, unlike KMR who uses a short BFI inventory to measure personality traits,
I used a more extensive BFI inventory to measure traits. In measuring traits, the use
of longer rather than "abbreviated" instruments is encouraged because they have a
higher Psychometric validity (See Gosling et al., 2003; Soto and John, 2017).
In a broader sense, therefore, the study will be an addition to the scanty evidence
on the impacts of psychological traits on economic behaviour in credit markets; this
of particular importance to financial institutions that lend mainly to poor borrowers,
who among other limitation do not have credit histories that can be used to gauge
their qualification for a loan. Thus, screening based on traits could be useful comple-
ments and maybe even substitutes (in some instances) for formal requirements like
3Lot of evidence have shown that when it comes to poverty in developing countries women tends
to share a large chunk of the burden. Thus, the program that targets women are likely to have more
impact on household welfare than otherwise (See Buvinic´ and Gupta, 1997, for details).
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past credit history, which poor borrowers find challenging to fulfil. Hence, if per-
sonality traits are found to be relevant in predicting loan default, a case can be made
for them to be part of alternative tools used for addressing asymmetric information
problems in microcredit markets. The objective of this paper is not to make such a
radical suggestion, but rather to show that psychological traits can reveal informa-
tion that markets do not reveal and in so doing they could be useful in addressing
market failures in credit markets.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: following the introduction in
section 3.1, section 3.2 discusses the evidence in the literature. In section 3.3, I de-
scribe the data collection and sampling technique. The empirical strategy, the issues
of identification and sample selection are discussed in section 3.5. In section 3.6,
I report and discuss the results. Finally, in the last section, I summarize my main
findings and give a conclusion.
3.2 Literature Review
The study of Personality trait is as old as the study of the human language (Matthews
et al., 2003). According to Almlund et al. (2011), Personality is a system of relation-
ships that map traits and other determinants of behaviour into actions. Hence, per-
sonality trait is one of the determinants of personality. Costa Jr and McCrae (1995)
define personality trait as "the relatively enduring styles of thinking, feeling, and
acting that characterize an individual." For this reason, it is widely believed, by per-
sonality psychologist and other social scientists, that there exists a relationship be-
tween personality traits and a lot of life outcomes such as schooling, employment,
and career paths (Matthews et al., 2003).
Despite abundant evidence in psychology that non-cognitive traits such as those
measured by the Five-Factor model affect behaviour, the empirical evidence on the
impact of non-cognitive traits on economic behaviour is still limited. Many of the
studies in economics on the subject are focused on the impact of personality traits on
labor market outcomes and the relationship between personality traits and trusting
behaviour or trustworthiness in behavioural games.
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In studying the impact of personality trait on household finances in Britain,
Brown and Taylor (2014) find that personality traits relating to factors in the Big
Factor Model (such as extraversion and openness to experience) correlate highly
with personal finances. Similarly, Donnelly et al. (2012) study the relationship be-
tween personality traits and money management and find evidence that conscien-
tious individuals are better in money management due to better financial attitudes
and future orientation. There is also an extensive (but not in any way exhaustive)
strand of literature focused on the relationship between personality traits and be-
haviour using insights from game theory. For instance, Boone et al. (1999) study
(non)-cooperative behaviour in prisoner’s dilemma games and the impact of per-
sonality traits on the outcomes of the games. They find evidence that personality
traits such as internal locus of control, high self-monitoring and high sensation seek-
ing are related to cooperative behaviour. In a similar vein, Kugler et al. (2014) study
whether personality traits (such as anxiousness and aggressiveness that are facets of
the neuroticism) affect strategic behaviour. They use a two-player entry-level game
in which a player gets a guaranteed reward by opting to stay out, gains more when
the player is the only one that enters, and gain less when both decide to enter. They
find that the level of anxiousness and aggressiveness determines a player’s choice
to enter or stay out in the game. In particular, anxious players enter less and ag-
gressive players enter more. Also, they find that anxious players were less likely
to enter than non-anxious players and aggressive players were more likely to enter
than non-aggressive players. Hammond and Morrill (2016) study the impact of per-
sonality on bidding behaviour in English auctions with competitive sellers. They
find evidence that personality traits measured using the Big Five taxonomy have
a significant impact on bidding behaviour for women. Braakmann (1999) use data
from the 2005 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) survey to study
the relationship between non-cognitive traits and the difference in the labor market
outcomes of men and women. He finds evidence that "psychological traits" have a
significant and non-negligible effect on the gender gap in employment and wages.
Rustichini et al. (2016) used laboratory experiments to study the relationship be-
tween personality traits and economic preferences. As in similar studies, they also
find that there exists a link between personality traits, particularly elements of the
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Big Five domains, and economic preferences. Additionally, their results indicate that
intelligence and Neuroticism constitute the core links through which personality
trait relate to economic preferences. Specifically, they find that intelligence correlates
positively with patience and Neuroticism is negatively correlated with the attitude
towards risk. Furthermore, their results also indicate that Extraversion is related to
aversion to ambiguity and Agreeableness play a significant role in predicting both
cognitive and behavioural responses in their setting. Mainly, they find that Agree-
ableness accurately predicts players beliefs on the action of others; higher Agree-
ableness scores relate with an inclination to expect more cooperative actors. From
their evidence, they concluded that adding non-cognitive measures to many cog-
nitive measures used by economists can significantly increase the predictive power
of most dependable variables, especially when these are real-world economic out-
comes.
In the microcredit literature, KMR was the only contribution I find where the
relationship between personality traits and default behaviour was studied. They
used both field experiments and survey methods to collect information on borrower
non-cognitive traits, which are then used to predict default behaviour. They find
that both individual morality and naivety (measured from the field experiments) do
have a significant impact on default behaviour. Specifically, borrowers with high
levels of morality are less likely to default and when they do they default with fewer
amounts. With regards to naivety, they find that borrows that are more naive about
their abilities to repay a loan are more likely to default. Besides, they also studied
whether generalised measures of personality traits, such as the elements of the Five-
Factor model, can predict default behaviour. They find that such general indicators
of non-cognitive traits do not predict loan default, in that in their study none of
them was found to have a significant impact on default. They used these pieces of
evidence to argue that moral hazard problems are real in micro-lending markets,
and also that there are tendencies for the existence of adverse selection problems
since personality traits are not observable to the lender.
Hence, the contribution of this study to the above strand of studies is that it uses
dispositional aspects of borrowers behaviour to study their default behaviour. As
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stated above, the study by KMR seems to be the only study in the microcredit liter-
ature that looks at the relevance of such indicators in predicting default behaviour.
And given that evidence from other areas of economics, such as behavioural and
labor market economics, show that these traits indeed matter for behaviour, implies
more evidence on them are required in the microcredit literature. This study is an
attempt to fill this gap.
3.3 Sampling
The data was collected via a survey of borrowers participating in a group-based
lending scheme of an NGO microcredit provider in Gambia called GAWFA (Gam-
bia Women Finance Association).4 GAWFA is among series of NGOs run micro-
credit programs found in Gambia that were established to fill the gap left by com-
mercial banks in the access to finance.5 The NGO is founded in 1987 by the com-
ing together of different women groups whose vision was to tackle the difficulties
faced by women in the access of formal financial services such as credit. However,
it was in 1997 that it got its license from the Central Bank of The Gambia, the official
regulator of microfinance or microcredit institutions in Gambia, to operate as the
first micro-credit institution in Gambia that is designed primarily for rural women.
Accordingly, about 96% of their existing clients are women, and 90% of them are
dwellers of rural communities. Currently, GAWFA is providing financial access to
about 14,377 women in 78 communities across the length and breadth of Gambia.
As of 2015, its total loan outstanding stood at about GMD 7 million (about $200,000),
making it one of the giant microcredit providers in Gambia. GAWFA offers two
forms of group-based lending: Large Group (LG) loan and Solidarity Group (SG)
loan.6 The LG loans are disbursed to groups of at least 12 members who use the loan
for either the income generation activities of the group or to finance members indi-
vidual income-generating activities. The SG loans, on the other hand, are disbursed
to groups of 3-11 members. Most members of the SG loan groups are market ven-
dors or family holders, and the loans are used for their income-generating activities.
4In the Gambia, lending programs targeting groups are organised through Kafoos or Compins.
These are "homogeneous group of individuals in a village with mutual interest" (Ouattara et al., 1993).
5The the introductory section of Ouattara et al. (1993) contains detail discussion of this phenomena
6Note that these are terms used by the organisation to define its group lending schemes.
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GAWFA does not directly influence the formation of groups by potential borrow-
ers; the client make this decision individually.7 The members of a loan group act as
guarantors to each other, which make all of them liable for any defaulted loan.
Consequently, a loan remained unpaid unless all the members responsible for the
loan repay on time. Considering that the main argument in favour of group-based
lending in the microfinance literature is that it reduces asymmetric information prob-
lems through joint liability for loans. The joint liability nature of the GAWFA lending
program makes it ideal for this study. To recover loans, GAWFA works with credit
officers that deal directly with group heads to collect the repayments for a loan;
when repayments are collected they were usually recorded in logbooks, but recently
GAWFA has developed an online platform where the information about a group
(including loan repayments) are recorded.
In selecting borrowers for the study, a multi-stage design is employed. In the
first stage, intervention communities with one of the loan schemes as mentioned
earlier schemes (LG loan or SG loan) of GAWFA are grouped into four strata given
by region. In each region or strata, 3 to 7 intervention communities were randomly
selected.8 In the second stage, 1 to 3 groups were randomly selected in each inter-
vention community, and all the members of the selected groups were interviewed.9
For the respondents selected, interviews were carried out face to face using struc-
tured questionnaires that were administered via an enumerator. Three different set
of questionnaires were administered during the survey. The first questionnaire col-
lected standard information on a borrower’s socio-demographic and non-socio de-
mographic characteristics. Besides, it also collected information on borrowers civic
and religious engagement, a perception of trust, fairness, help, and bonding social
capital. The second questionnaire collected information on borrowers personality
traits, i.e. on the dispositional aspects of a borrower’s behaviour. To this effect, a 30
item personality trait instrument, the so-called BFI-2-S (See Soto and John, 2017) was
7I am aware that this could be a source for potential selection bias.
8The Randomisation was done using excel. First, random numbers were generated and then they
are ordered ascendingly. After the ordering, the first 3 to 7 rows (in the case of intervention communi-
ties) and the first 1 to 3 rows (in the case of groups) are selected.
9If the enumerator is unable to interview any member of a selected group, then, he has to organise
for a recall and the time frame for the recall is 1-7 days. If after 7 days the individual is still not available
for an interview, she is considered a nonresponse.
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used. This instrument is a brief version of the 44 item inventory of (See John and Sri-
vastava, 1999) commonly applied in personality psychology. Each item constitutes
a sentence containing an adjective that may or may not describe the individual, and
the individual is required to rate herself on each item using a Likert Scale from 1 to
5. The third questionnaire was a social network questionnaire, and to answer the
questions on this questionnaire, a respondent was provided with a list of all the con-
tacts in her group. She is asked to indicate which contacts in the list came to her for
a particular form of advice or help, and also those she goes to for the specific advice
or help. For each contact specified, the respondent is also requested to specify the
type of relationship she shares with the named person.10
All the questionnaires, except the social network questionnaire (administered in
paper form), were administered using the Magpi CAPI survey tool.11 The interviews
were carried out between October and December 2016 by a team of 5 enumerators
with a single supervisor (the lead researcher). The enumerators were distributed
across the four regions involved in the study and each covered about four villages.
An enumerator was mandated to stay in a village until all the groups in the village
are covered, and all members of the group are interviewed. To facilitate their work
in the field, they were all provided with smartphones and power banks. All enu-
merators were required to upload all their completed questionnaires onto the Magpi
platform daily, which are checked by the supervisor daily. The supervisor’s role was
to ensure that all questionnaires uploaded were freed of data collection errors that
can be corrected in the field, as errors found are supposed to be addressed before an
enumerator leaves a village.
Given that most of the respondents are illiterates and with little or no knowledge
of the official language, English, all questionnaires were administered in the local
language comfortably understood by the respondent.12 In this regard, enumerators
were used that are thoroughly conversant in the language widely spoken in the com-
munities where they were to be sent. Familiarity with the region was also considered
10The information from the social network question is not used in the current paper.
11Magpi is a leading provider of configurable, cloud-based mobile collection, communication, and
data visualisation tools to let organisations improve the effectiveness of their mobile workforce and
improve field operations, see http://home.magpi.com/about/
12Usually this is a language of the dominant tribe or ethnic group in the community where the
interview was conducted.
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an essential factor for selection. Furthermore, two-day training of enumerators was
also done to train enumerators on using the data collection App and administer-
ing the survey instruments. Another purpose of the training was to ensure that the
enumerators can administer the questionnaires in the local languages.
Regarding the personality trait questionnaire, all trait adjectives used in the in-
ventory were translated into the local language by the researcher via the assistance
of a native speaker of the local language and after a backward translation is done to
English. If ambiguity arises in the meaning of an English adjective when translated
in the local language, about five native speakers are randomly sought and ask about
the meaning of the adjective in their local language. Adopted as the appropriate
meaning of that adjective in the local language is the most common interpretation
given by these respondents. In selecting the enumerators, therefore, I emphasise
being a native speaker of the local language to be used in administering the ques-
tionnaires and also obtaining credit in English in the high school final examinations.
These checks were instituted to ensure that the responses to the questions, especially
those in the personality trait questionnaire, are not motivated by poor translation of
the questions in the local language of the respondent by the enumerator.
Therefore, from an initial sample of 600 respondents, I got 528 responses, and
there were 72 non-responses; they couldn’t be interviewed within the recall time
frame stipulated. So, the response rate is about 82 per cent. However, about 11
observations were further lost during the data cleaning. Thus, the final sample con-
stitutes 517 individual observations. The total number of communities selected was
18, and about 34 groups were involved, out of which 20 were solidarity groups, and
14 were large groups.
3.4 The Big Five Inventory
In personality psychology, there is a generally agreed notion that only five or six di-
mensions of personality are the source of much of the variation in human behaviour
(Rustichini et al., 2016). Hence, the Five-Factor model, which measures personality
by relying on five big dimensions, is the most widely used measure of personality
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traits. It involves the grouping of traits into mutually exclusive categories using ap-
proaches that originated from the lexical hypothesis; an idea that was first used by
Galton (1884). It is based on the premise that the most important traits in people lives
can be expressed as single terms in their common language (Goldberg, 1993). Hence,
a good starting point for a "shared taxonomy is the natural language" (John et al.,
2008). The idea that personality traits can be studied by grouping traits into mu-
tually exclusive categories using terms from the common language came from the
contributions of German psychologist Baumgarten (1933) and Allport and Odbert
(1936).13 The contribution of the former was stimulated by the work of another Ger-
man Psychologist Klages (1926) who first hinted that the careful analysis of language
could help in the understanding of personality traits (Digman, 1990). The finding of
these authors laid the ground for a common taxonomy of personality traits and the
emergence of personality trait measures such as FFM.
The Big orFive-Factor model involves the grouping of personality traits into five
main domains, namely: Extraversion, Neuroticism, Openness to Experience, Consci-
entiousness, and Agreeableness. For the sake of preciseness, each of these domains
could be further divided into facets. The development of the Five-Factor model of
personality started with Thurston (1934) and Raymond Cartell (See Cattell, 1943). It
was developed further by several authors (such as Norman, 1963; Digman, 1963)).
McCrae and Costa Jr (1985) built on the work of the previous contributors, particu-
larly Eysenck (1970) who first introduced Neuroticism and Extraversion, and created
a variant of the personality factor model called the NEO (for Neuroticism, Extrover-
sion and Openness to experience; respectively) personality instrument. In Costa
and MacCrae (1992), the NEO instrument was revised to include two more factors
(Conscientiousness and Agreeableness) to make it a standard Five-Factor personal-
ity inventory (See Goldberg, 1993, for more elaboration.)
Each of the domains constitutes many traits (Goldberg, 1993). Extraversion mea-
sure how energetic an individual is and to what extent is the individual engaged
with the world, as well as the individuals’ social attitude. Hence, it can be viewed
as a contrast between traits such as activity level, assertiveness and talkativeness
and traits such as being passive, reserve, and silence (Goldberg, 1993). Neuroticism
13(See John et al., 2008) for details.
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measures emotional instability, that is, the tendency of an individual to experience
negative feelings or other forms of emotional discontent such as anxiety, anger, or
to suffer from stress. Therefore, it constitutes traits such as nervousness, moodiness,
not contented, shyness, and not self-confident. Openness to Experience measures
the extent to which an individual is curious, imaginative, and appreciates new and
unconventional ideas, as well as, being aesthetic or having passionate feelings. Con-
scientiousness is a measure of whether an individual has a future orientation or not.
Hence, it includes traits that capture things like competence, orderliness, dutiful-
ness and deliberation and also self-discipline. Agreeableness measures the ability
and tendency of an individual to cooperate with others as well as the individual’s
level of altruism. It involves facets that measure cooperative behaviours such as
trust, straightforwardness, altruism, compliance, modesty, and tender-mindedness.
To measure the elements of the BFI, I follow the approach of Goldberg (1990).14
Specifically, the BFI I use consists of 5 domains (as outlined above) and each domain
or element of the BFI is further divided into an average of 6 personality facets or
items.15 Therefore, the BFI inventory used here is an abbreviated version of the 44
item BFI found in John and Srivastava (1999).16 There is evidence (e.g. Soto and
John, 2017) supporting psychometric validity of brief BFI inventories. Hence, due to
the fear of not to bore interviewees with lengthy questionnaires, many researchers
(particularly in economics) opt for a shorter rather than a long personality trait in-
strument. However, the fact that long instruments have better psychometric features
than small instruments (Gosling et al., 2003), they should be preferred when it is
ideal. It is for the latter reason that I decided to use a longer instrument here.
As indicated in the previous section, the data was collected by asking each to
rate herself on each of the 30 items of the BFI inventory using a five-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (disagrees strongly) to 5 ( Agrees strongly); the questionnaire
is reported in the appendix. Then, the individual score in each domain is computed
14The primary difference between Goldberg (1990) BF instrument and other similar instruments
of the Five-Factor model is that he assumed that the warmth facet captures more Extraversion than
agreeableness. Therefore, warmth is categorised in the Extraversion group.
15Note that the number of items and facets are the same in my case because I am using one item per
facet. This need not to hold always.
16This method of constructing the FFM was first proposed by Costa and MacCrae (1992) and is
widely known as the NEO-PI-R (that is the revised NEO Personal Inventory).
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by averaging her score on all the items that constitute that domain. As different sub-
groups have a different number of items, I standardised the scores around mean
zero and standard deviation one; so, only the standardised scores are used in the
analysis. Given that scale based measures are used to collect information on vari-
ables that cannot be measured explicitly, it is a good practice to check for internal
validity of these measures; to this effect, reliability measures such as the Cronbach’s
alpha or factor analysis are employed. In this regard, I checked for internal consis-
tency of the elements of the BFI using the Cronbach’s alpha. 17 The results indicate a
reliability index that ranges from 0.63 for Openness to Experience to 0.75 for Consci-
entiousness. The reliability indexes I obtained are less than those found by John and
Srivastava (1999); he reported that the reliability indices for the 44 item BFI scales
is between .75 and .90. The difference could be driven by the fact that I am using a
brief instrument.18
3.5 Empirical Strategy
3.5.1 Model
Given that the main outcome variable of interest is binary, a simple logistic model
was used to estimate the impact of personality traits on the repayment behaviour
of borrowers. In the literature loan default is the primary variable that is used to
capture repayment behaviour. It is, therefore, the most focused on outcome variable
for researchers and practitioners (Karlan, 2007). But in my case, I do not have a data
on group loan defaults as the credit provider does not have a proper record of this
data for the clients. Furthermore, given that I am interested in individual default
behaviour, I use delinquency - measured by a borrower’s self-report of whether she
once fail to repay a loan on time or not - as a proxy for individual borrower’s default.
This variable is coded as one for individual who reported that they have not paid
a past loan on time and zero otherwise. As such a measure of default is somewhat
subjective, all self-reports were verified from the group heads; one might wonder
17(Bland and Altman, 1997) provide a brief and comprehensive introduction of the Crohnbach’s
alpha.
18See Mueller and Plug (2006) for an explanation of how the number of items affects the reliability
index of a measure.
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why to verify through the group heads and not the credit officers. The motivation
behind this is two-fold: first, the group heads are usually responsible for collecting
individual repayments and hands them over to the loan officer who records the pay-
ment immediately on the GAWFA online loan recovery platform (before used to be
on a loan recovery book) and gives the head, on behalf of the group, a receipt of
repayment. Thus, the group heads are more informed about individual late repay-
ments than the loan officer. Second, it sometimes occurs that an individual fails to
repay on time, but this is unknown to the loan officer as the group repays on time;
this happens when the group head or some other member(s) of the group pays on
behalf of a defaulted member to ensure that the group repays on time.
Therefore, on the right side of the logistic model, I have the personality trait vari-
ables (measured using the Five-Factor model) and control variables. The personality
traits are Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Open-
ness to Experience. There are two sets of control variables: One set controlling for
individual differences in social capital and the other set controlling for individual
differences in cognitive traits such as age, education, marital status, and ownership
of a business or income from an owned business. The inclusion of social capital
variables as a control variable is motivated by evidence in the group lending liter-
ature (e.g. Cassar et al., 2007; Ahlin and Townsend, 2007) that social capital affects
repayment behaviour. For this reason, I also include social capital variables to see
the extent to which they matter for default behaviour in a model with borrower’s
personality trait indicators.
Social capital is measured by asking respondents five questions around their
bonding social capital, which are reported on a Likert scale from 1 (it does not ap-
ply to me) to 5 (it very strongly apply to me). Specifically, the five questions that
measure bonding social capital are: "I live in a close-knit neighbourhood," "People
in neighbourhood are are generally willing to help their neighbours," "People in my
neighbourhood don’t like each other," "People in my neighborhood share the same
value," "People in my neighborhood can be trusted." The latter method of measur-
ing bonding social capital was first used by the Project on Human Development in
Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN) (Usher, 2005). The individual scores on the five
items are averaged for each respondent to obtain an index that captures their social
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capital, which is called socindex in the dataset. Again since the measure is collected
from self-reports using Likert scales, it is recommended to check for its construct
validity using a reliability index. As for the personality indicators, a Cronbach’s al-
pha is used for this purpose. The results are reported in Table 3.1. It can be seen
that the reliability index of the measure is about 0.69, which is acceptable. The stan-
dardised score has a minimum value of -3.84 and a maximum value of 1.73. Another
method of measuring social capital that is commonly employed in the group lending
literature (e.g. in Karlan, 2005) is using three questions from the Generalized Social
Survey (GSS in short) that captures individual perception on "trust," "fairness," and
"helping" as a measure of social capital. There is proven evidence that perception
on these items is significantly related to real-world outcomes (Karlan, 2005). Hence,
I also included them in my survey to check whether they affect the repayment be-
haviour of the borrowers studied. In other words, whether such general measures of
social capital used in a developed country context can also capture social capital in
a developing country context. All the two measures of social capital are included in
the model as an index. That is they are pooled into a single measure, which is used
for the analysis; this was done by summing the respondent’s reported score on each
of the items and then standardising this around mean zero and standard deviation
one. Note that for GSS measure of social capital I also checked its reliability index;
this is reported in Table 3.2. The alpha coefficient of the measure is 0.77, and the
standardised scores have a minimum value of -2.94 and a maximum value of 2.30;
even though not that high, it is also acceptable.
Therefore, the logistic model to be estimated can be summarized as follows:
logit(yi) = α1 +
P=5
∑
i=1
β1ix1i +
Q=2
∑
i=1
β2ix2i +
C=7
∑
i=0
β3ix3i + ei (3.1)
Where x1i denotes a set of P = 5 variables constituting of the 5 personality traits
variables from the BF model, the x2i denotes a set of Q = 2 variables that measure
the social capital variables, and x3i denotes set C = 7 control variables that measure
the cognitive traits of the borrower. The variable yi is the dependent variable rep-
resenting the odd ratio of not repaying a loan, which is measured from borrowers
self-reports on their past default. It is coded 0 if the individual reports that she has
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TABLE 3.1: Reliability Index of Social Capital Index
Interim Correlations-Crohnbach Alpha
knit aidneig hate* samval trust
Knit 1.00
Aidneig 0.34 1.00
Hate 0.26 0.41 1.00
Samval 0.12 0.18 0.27 1.00
Trust 0.30 0.50 0.34 0.07 1.00
Alpha 0.69
* The scales on this measure are reversed.
See table 2 for the description of variables.
TABLE 3.2: Reliability Index of GSSindex
Interim Correlations-Crohnbach Alpha
GSS1 GSS2 GSS3
GSS1 1.00
GSS2 0.56 1.00
GSS3 0.49 0.53 1.00
Alpha 0.77
never defaulted on a past loan and 1 if the individual reported that she has once
defaulted on a past loan. Note that default here means the individual was not able
to repay a loan on time; hence, it is a measure of delinquency and not actual default.
Consequently, a shortcoming of this measure is that it does not directly measure the
repayment performance of a group, as individual late repayment does not necessar-
ily lead to group default. However, if it (late repayment) is rampant in a group it
could affect group performance; that is many group members not being able to re-
pay on time could force a group not to repay on time. Indeed, the measure can be a
proxy of how individual behaviour might affect group outcomes and consequently
the performance of a group-based lending scheme; having said that it is important to
note that in this study the focus is on individual default behaviour and not on group
default. Another shortcoming of the measure is that it is based on self-reports by
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the borrower, which tend to be subjective. However, in reference to Petrick (2005),
Dufhues et al. (2012, 2013) highlighted that no "plausible argument" exist to presume
that subjective information are less valid than other information in survey data. In
this regard, even if subjectivity of the measure could be a concern, no proper ev-
idence exist to suggest that this will invalidate the measure of default. Moreover,
given that self-reports by the borrower were further verified from the group head,
who collect individual repayments, increases the validity of the measure.
In estimating the model, three different specifications are used: The first speci-
fication is a model with just the critical core variables. In the second specification,
the variables that measure trust and bonding social capital are added to the first
specification to capture the effect of social capital on default behaviour. In the third
specification, the cognitive trait variables are added, as control variables, to the sec-
ond specification. The essence of these three specification is to see how the addition
of additional explanatory variables to the critical core variables changes the logistic
regression results as well as to see the relevance of model specification.
In all estimations, cluster effects (clustering at the group level) were controlled
for, and standard errors were estimated using the jackknife method; Quenouille
(1956) first introduced this method, and extended by Tukey (1958) for variance es-
timation. As a nonparametric repeated sampling technique, the jackknife method
is similar to bootstrap with the advantage that it is more robust in small samples
(See Efron and Stein, 1981). Given that only 34 groups are involved in the study
implies the study consist of 34 clusters and resampling is done in these clusters; this
is the motivation of using the jackknife resampling technique. All estimations were
done in STATA 14, and I used the svy command to capture the survey design in the
estimations.
3.5.2 Identification Issues
In relating default behaviour to individual borrower’s characteristics, Karlan (2007)
has highlighted two identification concerns that are due to peer-selection by bor-
rowers into borrowing groups; omitted variable bias and simultaneity bias. Omitted
variables bias arises because self-selection means individual join groups based on
characteristics that are not observable to the researcher, which could correlate with
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both the observed characteristics as well as group outcomes. Simultaneity bias, on
the other hand, arises when the relationship between individual characteristics and
group outcomes can be inferred in both directions.
A good example is where successful groups lead to better social relations; hence,
the direction of causation between group outcomes and social relations occurs in
both ways, thus, making causal inference ambiguous (See Karlan, 2007, for detail
discussions). Therefore, given that social capital variables were added in specifica-
tion II and III, simultaneity bias could be a concern in these models. But, the good
news here is that the measures employed to collect data on social capital were based
on generalised perception on trust or help or fairness, and there is evidence that gen-
eralised perceptions on trust and help are determined by village level outcomes that
are independent of individual or group level outcomes. In this sense, these measures
of social capital can be regarded as exogenous. For this reason, I do not worry about
the problem of simultaneity bias for my social capital variables.
Simultaneity bias could also arise from the personality trait variables. To see
why, assume that borrowers with a higher level of non-cognitive traits are more
likely to join high performing loan groups. In this case, it is not far-fetched that per-
sonality traits affect repayment behaviour and that repayment behaviour can also
affect the borrowers observed level of personality traits. This potential for simul-
taneity bias mainly arise when individual personality traits are not stable in that
group level outcomes can impact them over time. To this effect, however, there exist
numerous evidence that personality traits are stable over time. For instance, Con-
ley (1985) find that "there is a set of personality traits that are generalisable across
methods of assessment and are stable throughout adulthood." Using a meta-analysis
approach, Roberts and DelVecchio (2000) study the stability of traits across different
age groups, and find that while the stability of personality traits varies across differ-
ent age groups, over a 6.7 year period, they tend to be stable in adults. In particular,
he finds that for individuals between age 50 and 70 the stability of traits reaches
up to 0.74 on a 1.0 maximum scale. Cobb-Clark and Schurer (2012) used data from
Australian households to study the stability of adult personality traits. They find
that the mean level change in personality traits (measured using the BFI model) of
adults between age 25 and 64 "are small and do not vary substantially across age
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groups." Other evidence on the stability of noncognitive traits for adults is reported
in (Aschwanden et al., 2017; Elkins et al., 2017; Mosca and Wright, 2018). Using these
evidences on the stability of personality traits over time, I conjecture that group out-
comes are unlikely to change borrowers individual personality trait levels over time;
consequently, I do not expect for traits to be endogenously determined. Such a stand
on the exogeneity of personality traits is not new; it is commonly used assumption
in researches that study the impact of personality on labour market outcomes (See
Viinikainen et al., 2010).
Additionally, I also checked whether personality traits are an essential deter-
minant of the likelihood to join groups by doing the following: first, I determine
whether an individual participates in any of the following other three groups - re-
ligious, political, and other loan groups. Second, the personality trait variables are
related to the probability of joining these groups to check if any significant relation-
ship exists. If a significant relation exists, one could conclude that personality traits
are essential factors for joining these groups, and therefore could also be a source
of bias for group selection. When this is not the case, then, there is weak evidence
that traits might not be relevant for group selection including the decision to join
loan groups. The underlying assumption of this exercise is that if traits are relevant
in group selection, then, I should observe a positive association between personal-
ity traits and the probability of joining a group. The results of this estimation are
reported in Table C.1 in appendix C. Controlling for possible confounds, I find that
none of the personality traits has a significant (at the conventional level of signif-
icance of 5%) effect on the probability of joining other groups. I use this as naive
evidence that omitted variable bias due to peer selection is not a fundamental prob-
lem in this context.
3.5.3 Sample Selection Bias
Since default behaviour, the outcome variable of interest, is observed only for partic-
ipants who have received a loan, this might be a source of unobserved selection. In
particular, suppose that those that are less(more) credit worthy are more(less) likely
to request for a loan. If such unobserved self selection correlates with default be-
haviour and is not modelled, it will bias the regression estimates. For this reason,
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to check for whether this phenomena exists in the data, I used a sample selection
model of the form suggested by (Heckman, 1979), also called the Heckman two-step
procedure or Heckit estimator (See Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 550).
Specifically, suppose the outcome of interest (loan default) is denoted by y∗ and
L∗ denotes the likelihood of receiving a first loan. Thus, while L∗ describes the deci-
sion of whether or not to take a loan, y∗ describe the decision of whether to repay or
not repay the loan. Therefore, given that there are factors (e.g. whether a borrowers
is a recipient of international remittances) that are more silent determinants of the
decision to take a loan than the decision to repay it, it is apparent that L∗ and y∗
might not be the same. Thus, the sample selection model comprises of participation
equation given as:
L =

1, if L∗ > 0
0, if L∗ ≤ 0
(3.2)
and an outcome equation of the following:
y =

y∗, if L∗1 > 0
−, if L∗1 ≤ 0
(3.3)
Hence, y is observed only when L∗ > 0. Therefore, as demonstrated by Van de Ven
and Van Praag (1981), I can specify the unobserved index of the likelihood to take a
loan (L∗) as:
L∗ = α2 +
j=3
∑
j=1
β jZji + µ1i (3.4)
With Zji a set of j = 3 exogenous variables that are determinants of the probability of
selection for the ith borrower, β j is a j = 3 unknown parameters, and e1j ∼ N(0, 1).
The outcome model for the entire sample from equation 3.1 can be written in vector
form as follow:
yi = xiβ+ µ2i (3.5)
With xi being a (15X1) vector of covariates as defined in equation 3.1 above; β is a
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(15X1) vector of parameters with x0=1, and µ2i ∼ N(0, 1). For the sample of borrow-
ers that have taken a loan, equation 3.5 is given as yi = (xiβ+ µ2i|L∗ > 0). Assume
that the correlation between µ1i and µ2i is given as ρ and that µ2i = ρλ(Z′β) + ε.
Heckman (1979) has shown that if ρ is not zero, then, an OLS or probit estimate of
the βs from the model of equation 3.5 using data from just the sample that took a
loan is bias (For more on this, see Van de Ven and Van Praag, 1981) . Thus, a Heckit
approach can be used to correct for such bias. This involves first using a probit
model to estimate the βs in the selection equation to get an estimate of the inverse
mill ratio λ(Z), which is used in a second stage model to get consistent estimates of
the coefficients of the main model of interest (See Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 550).
Note, however, that if the personality trait indicators are endogenous, then, the two-
stage approach will be inappropriate as one of its fundamental assumptions is that
the regressors in the main equation are exogenous (See Wooldridge, 2010, p. 813-14).
For reasons discussed in section 3.5.2, I do not worry about this problem. Also, note
that a test of ρ = 0 is a test of sample selection. Thus, I use this approach to test for
the existence of a sample selection in the data. The results are discussed in the next
section.
3.6 Analysis of Empirical Results
Table 3.3 reports the descriptive statistics of the critical core variables and the social
capital variables for defaulters and non defaulters. The critical core variables are do-
mains of the BFI discussed in details in section 3.4, i.e. Agreeableness, Extraversion,
Neuroticism, Conscientiousness and Openness to Experience. Note that the sum-
mary statistics of the critical core variables reported in Table 3.3 are based on the
unstandardised values of the variables. The results show that, except for Neuroti-
cism, the mean score on each of the domains of the BFI is higher for non-defaulters
than for defaulters. However, only the difference in the mean score of agreeable-
ness is significant at 95% confidence level. The mean difference in Extraversion and
Openness to Experience are significant only at 90% confidence level, and for Consci-
entiousness and Neuroticism, the difference in means between the two groups is not
significant. Also, the results indicate that the individuals or borrowers that repay
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TABLE 3.3: Summary Statistics: Critical Core Variables and Social
Capital Variables
Never Defaulted Once Defaulted Sign. of Mean Diff.
mean & std. dev. & mean std. dev. & p-values*
std error no. of obs std error no. of obs
ExTra 9.22 4.21 8.66 4.17 0.08
(0.14) n = 294 (0.16) n = 129
AgRea 14.54 3.35 13.48 3.80 0.01
(0.22) n = 294 (0.27) n = 130
ConSci 13.11 3.92 12.88 3.99 0.65
(0.29) n = 291 (0.28) n = 130
NeuTis 2.14 3.68 2.19 4.34 0.44
(0.17) n = 294 (0.23) n = 130
Open 22.71 4.55 22.01 4.18 0.08
(0.16) n = 293 (0.19) n = 130
Socindex 20.30 2.70 19.06 3.47 0.00
(0.11) n = 296 (0.17) n = 130
Gssindex 0.53 1.10 0.07 1.18 0.00
(0.04) n = 296 (0.04) n = 130
Note: For each variable, the table reports the mean, the Jackknife standard error of the estimate
of the mean, the standard deviation, and the number of observations in each sub-sample used
to obtain the summary statistic. Also reported are the the p-values from a t-test of a statistical
significance of difference in means between the two groups. The statistics here are calculated from
the unstandardised values of the variables.
* The p-values reported are the two tailed test p-values.
on time have a higher mean score on bonding social capital than those that do not
repay on time, and the difference in means between the two groups on social capital
is highly significant.
The characteristics of the borrowers in the sample are reported in Table 3.4, which
also contains brief description of all the variables . For the borrowers in the final
sample, about 83% have reported that they have already received their first loan
from GAWFA. More than 70% of the borrowers are participants in LG loan schemes.
The average of the loan taken is about 2561 Dalasi (about $60), and more than 50%
of the borrowers have received at least this amount from the last loan taken. Among
those that received a loan from GAWFA, about 31% have reported that they have
once defaulted on a pass loan. The average age of the borrowers in the sample is
about 41 years, and about 38% are above the mean age. Only 25% of the borrowers
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TABLE 3.4: Summary Statistics: All Variables
Mean Std. dev. N
Dependent Variable
paid= Did you always pay your loan on time? (yes=0, no=1) 0.31 0.46 426
Independent variables
Core critical variables
ExTra= Extraversion 9.27 4.13 513
AgRea= Agreeableness 14.22 3.50 514
ConSci= Conscientiousness 13.34 3.94 511
NeuTis= Neuroticism 1.97 3.91 514
Open= Openness to experience 22.67 4.38 513
Social Capital Variables
Gss1= People can be trusted 0.31 0.84 517
Gss2= People try to be fair -0.18 0.88 517
Gss3= People are helpful 0.25 0.87 517
Gssindex* 0.37 1.15 517
Knit= Lives in a close knit neighborhood 4.49 0.84 517
Aidneig= Neighbors helpful to one another 4.50 0.94 517
Hate= Neighbors don’t like each other 2.60 1.09 517
Samval= Neighbors share same value) 2.23 2.30 517
trust= Neighbors are trustful 4.41 1.09 517
Socindex** 20.02 2.87 517
Other Control Variables
Married= Marital status(married=1, not married=0) 0.87 0.48 517
Age 40.59 14.29 513
Educa= Attended school (yes=1, no=0) 0.25 0.43 517
Yedu= Year of education 7.23 3.99 128
lonval= Value of last loan 2561.00 2861.72 400
Ownbuz= Ownership of business (yes=1, no=0) 0.57 0.50 517
Other variables
Reloan= Received first loan(yes=1, no=0) 0.83 .38 517
Fabrd= Has a family member abroad(yes=1, no=0) 0.50 0.50 517
Grotyp = Group type (LG=1, SG=2) 1.28 0.45 517
* The gssindex is calculated as the average score of the responses to gss1, gss2, and gss3. Note in
the estimation we use the standardized score of the sum of the three, which are denoted with the
subscript a1 added to the names.
** Like the gssindex, the socindex is also computed as the average score of the responses to the
five bonding social capital questions. The response range from 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree
strongly), and the response scales for hate are reversed.
have attended any form of formal education. The rate of business ownership among
borrowers is about 51%. The majority of the business owners, more than 60%, are
engaged in petty trading including the selling of agricultural produce.
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3.6.1 The Effect of the Big Five on Default Probability
Table 3.5 reports the results from the logistic regression specified in equation 3.1. As
discussed in section 3.5.1, the logistic model is estimated using three specifications.
The first specification is estimation of a model of default behaviour with just the crit-
ical core variables. In the second specification, the social capital variables are added
to the core variables of interest to control for the effect of social capital on default
behaviour. The third specification is obtained by adding the other cognitive trait
variables to the second specification. Given that these last model is the richest of the
three, it is the main specification of interest. The results of each of the specifications
are reported, respectively, as Spec I, Spec II, and Spec III in the table. Generally, the
results show that controlling for social capital and cognitive trait variables improve
the results; specifically, the log likelihood of the model improves with the addition
of more variables to the critical core variables. As expected, a log likelihood ratio
test (results not reported) indicate that specification three is a better specification.
For this reason, the discussions here are based on the Spec III of Table 3.5.
Except for Conscientiousness, the results indicate that all the domains of the mea-
sure of personality traits have a negative effect on the probability of default. In
particular, Extraversion is associated with a decrease in the predicted probability of
default, and it has a weak statistical significance of 10%. Hence, borrowers that are
more sociable and active are less likely to default than borrowers who score low on
these traits. As expected, a higher level of Agreeableness, which captures coopera-
tive and trusting attitudes, is associated with a decrease in the predicted probability
of default, and this is statistically significant at 5%. Conscientiousness increases the
predicted probability, but unlike the other traits it it is not statistically significant.
Given that conscientiousness measures trait such as being hardworking or organ-
ised or resourceful, it is surprising that having such characteristics have a positive
predictive probability on default.
A higher level of Neuroticism is also negatively associated with the likelihood of
default, and it is statistically significant at 5%; hence, individuals that are emotion-
ally unstable are less likely to default. This result is somehow intuitive as it implies
individuals who know that they can quickly get depressed or angered by the action
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TABLE 3.5: Borrowers Default Behavior
Dependent Variable: Individual Default
SpecI SpecII SpecIII
ExTraa1 -0.149*** -0.140*** -0.054*
(0.038) (0.032) (0.044)
AgReaa1 -0.353*** -0.231*** -0.228**
(0.071) (0.075) (0.081)
ConScia1 0.110 0.061 0.004
(0.089) (0.084) (0.082)
NeuTisa1 -0.125* -0.130* -0.173**
(0.066) (0.069) (0.075)
Opena1 -0.119** -0.049 -0.080*
(0.052) (0.048) (0.044)
Socindex -0.096*** -0.102***
(0.017) (0.019)
Gssindex -0.337*** -0.320***
(0.047) (0.051)
Education 0.428***
(0.071)
Ownbuz -0.063**
(0.221)
Age -0.014***
(0.003)
Married 0.037
(0.200)
Grotyp (SG) 0.810**
(0.281))
Memlo 0.193***
(0.0658)
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.06 0.11
LogL -251.38 -242.66 -230.51
N 419 419 419
*** 99% significance; ** 95% significance; *90% significance.
Note: Reported in parenthesis are the jackknife standard error that corrects for clustering at the group
level. Spec I = logistic regression with just personality trait variables; Spec II= logistic regression with
personality traits variables and social capital variables; Spec III = logistic regression with all variables
including cognitive trait variables. LogL= Log likelihood and N= number of observations. All the
personality trait variables are standardized. Memlo = Whether respondent is member of other loan
groups.
of other towards them when they do not repay their debts on time are more probable
to repay on time. The explanation could be that they repay on time because they do
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not want to face the negative social consequences that come with late repayments.
Notice that the coefficient of the Neuroticism variable in specification I (without so-
cial capital variables and other controls) is negative and significant in Table 3.5, even
though the descriptive statistics reported in Table 3.3 indicate that it is higher for
delinquent borrowers. Thus, at first glance this result seems a bit puzzling. How-
ever, it could be explained by the fact that I use the standardised scores rather than
the level scores of the personality variables in the regression analysis. Moreover,
also note that even though controls (other variables different from personality traits)
are not included in specification I, this specification contains other personality trait
variables different from Neuroticism. Hence, this might be another reason why the
coefficient of the Neuroticism variable changes sign and is significant in specification
I.
Also, I find that Openness to Experience is associated with decrease in the prob-
ability of default, which is also statistically significant at 10%. The negative rela-
tionship between default and Openness to Experience is consistent with the a priori
expectation. When you are a business owner, true for more than 50 per cent of the
borrowers in the sample, then, Openness to Experience could mean willingness to
take a risk. There is extensive evidence in the finance and management literature
that willingness to take risk is positively related to business success. For this reason,
a high level of Openness to Experience should be associated with a decreased prob-
ability of default, which is what I find. The marginal effects of the variables on the
default probability are reported in Figure C.1 in appendix.
In discussing the results, so far I focus on just the signs of the coefficients from the
logistic regressions; this is because the meaning of the magnitude of the coefficients
of a non linear model are not clear cut. In this regard, I also computed the average
marginal effects (AMEs), which are reported in Table 3.6. The magnitudes of the
AMEs have more meaningful interpretation than the coefficients. For the analysis,
like before I focus on specification III of the logistic model. Therefore, the results in-
dicate that a standard deviation increase in Extraversion reduces the predicted prob-
ability of default by 3% and this effect is statistically significant at 1%. A standard
deviation increase in the participants level of Agreeableness decreases the partici-
pant’s likelihood of not repaying her loan by about 4%. For Conscientiousness, a
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TABLE 3.6: Borrowers Default Behavior: Average Marginal Effects
Dependent Variable: Individual Default
SpecI SpecII SpecIII
ExTraa1 -0.031*** -0.028*** -0.027***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
AgReaa1 -0.073*** -0.045*** -0.036**
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
ConScia1 0.023 0.061 0.007
(0.014) (0.066) (0.012)
NeuTisa1 -0.130** -0.026** -0.028**
(0.052) (0.010) (0.010)
Opena1 -0.024** -0.049 -0.010
(0.010) (0.044) (0.007)
Socindex -0.096*** -0.041***
(0.013) (0.009)
Gssindex -0.337*** -0.059***
(0.047) (0.010)
Education 0.083***
(0.021)
Ownbuz -0.119***
(0.025)
Age -0.003***
(0.001)
Married -0.007
(0.033)
Fabrd -0.001
(0.017)
Grotyp (SG) 0.161**
(0.032))
Memlo 0.318
(0.1079)
N 419 419 415
*** 99% significance; ** 95% significance; *90% significance.
Note: Reported in parenthesis are the jackknife standard error that corrects for clustering at the group
level. Spec I = Model with just personality trait variables, Spec II= model with personality traits vari-
ables and social capital variables , Spec III = Model with all variables including cognitive trait variables.
All the personality trait variables are standardized. Memlo = whether participant is member of other
loan groups.
standard deviation increase in the trait increases the predicted probability of default
by 0.7 percent. It is the only trait variable that increases the probability of default,
but it is not statistically significant. Like Extraversion, a standard deviation increase
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in Neuroticism reduces the participant’s probability of default on a loan by about
3 percent and the effect is also statistically significant. Increase in Openness to Ex-
perience is associated with about 1 percent decrease in the probability of default,
but is not statistically significant. Therefore, among the personality trait measures,
Agreeableness has the highest impact on the probability of default.
3.6.2 The Effect of Cognitive Traits on Default Probability
The estimation results on the predictive power of the cognitive trait variables on
the probability of default are reported in Table 3.5. Explicitly, the results indicate
that being educated is positively associated with the probability of default and it is
highly statistically significant. The AME of educations on the probability of default
is about 0.08, thus, implying that educated participants are 8 percent more likely to
repay their loans than non-educated participants, which is against the exante expec-
tation. A priori we expect higher human capital levels, an indication of the level
of productivity, to be negatively associated with loan default; i.e. more productive
borrowers (measured by education level) are more likely to invest their loan more
productively (See Ahlin and Townsend, 2007). Nowithstanding the a priori expec-
tations, the result on the impact of education on loan default has been mixed (See
Hill et al., 2012); some empirical studies find postive effects and others find negative
effects. Concerning why education might relate positively with loan default, two
explanation could be given: first, it could be motivated by the fact that education is
negatively related with informal business (See Jimenez et al., 2015), and in develop-
ing countries, informal business is more rampant. Thus, when money is borrowed,
and it is not used to set up or bolster an informal business then it is more likely to
be spent unproductively, which reduces the probability of repaying it. Second, as
explained in detail in Hill et al. (2012), it could be that education is negatively corre-
lated to credit rationing or that it is positively correlated with outside credit options.
These factors put together imply that educated borrowers are less worried by the
performance of group loans, and therefore they usually don’t mind defaulting on
such loans. Like in Hill et al. (2012), my findings support this latter view.
As expected, owning a business decreases the probability of default. In terms
of AME, Table 3.6 shows that borrowers that own a business are about 12 percent
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less likely to default on a loan than borrowers that do not own a business. Given
that owning a business is akin to the productive use of a loan, it should not be far-
fetched that it reduces the probability of default. I also find that age is negatively
related to default probability, and it is highly statistically significant. In particular,
an additional year increase in age of the borrower results to about 0.3 percent statis-
tical significant decline in the borrower probability to default on a loan. Hence, older
borrowers are more likely to repay their loans on time than younger borrowers. A
similar finding is reported by Mokhtar et al. (2012), and they provided two expla-
nations for this: one, older borrowers are more experience in business than younger
borrowers; hence, they are less likely to face repayment difficulties associated with
business failure. Two, being young increases the believe that you can get a loan
from another microcredit provider even if you once defaulted with other providers.
Another explanation of this phenomena could be that older women see their micro-
credit loans as the only source of external financing to bolster their business while
young women have other means of external financing; that is they have stronger
outside options (such as relying on parents or other family members for financial
support) that older women.
With regards to group size, the finding is that being a member of a small group
increases the probability of not repaying a loan on time, and the effect is highly sig-
nificant. The AME of group size shows that borrowers in sodarity groups (i.e. small
groups) are 16 percent more probable of not repaying their loans on time than bor-
rowers in large groups. This finding is in contrast with the evidence in the literature
(e.g. Abbink et al., 2006) that larger group size is associated with more loan repay-
ment problems. Due to moral hazard problems, as group size increases peer mon-
itoring becomes more costly, thus, increasing default probability. However, Ahlin
(2015) have theoretically demonstrated that depending on the amount of social cap-
ital that exists within groups, under adverse selection, higher group size leads to
higher loan repayment. In this regard, the impact of group size on loan repayment
is not clear-cut. But the results obtained here are consistent with Ahlin (2015). Ta-
ble 3.6 indicate that married borrowers are 0.7 percent more likely to default than
non-married borrowers, but the effect is not statistically significant.
For social capital variables, Table 3.5 shows that both the measure of bonding
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social capital and the GSS measure of social capital are associated with negative de-
fault probability and are highly significant. Specifically, the average marginal effects
imply that for social capital measured via the GSS index, a unit increase leads to
6% statistically significant decline in the probability of default. A unit increase in
bonding social capital decreases the probability of default by about 4% and is sta-
tistically significant. Therefore, consistent with the evidence in the literature, briefly
discussed in section 3.5.1, I also find evidence that higher social capital motivates
higher loan repayment; this finding about social capital is almost a stylized fact in
the group lending literature.
3.6.3 Selection Bias
As highlighted in section 3.5.3, since information on repayment behaviour is col-
lected on just participants that have once taken a loan, this could results to sample
selection problems. For this reason, I check for possible selection bias by using the
approach described in section 3.5.3. In particular, I use Heckman two step approach
to test for the presence of sample selection bias in the data. In the first stage, a binary
model of the probability of taking a loan (i.e. equation 3.4) is estimated; this first
stage regression is used for getting the βs and inverse mill ratio(i.e. λ(Z′ β̂)), which
is used as a regressor in the probit model of the second stage (i.e. equation 3.5). Ac-
cording to (Wooldridge, 2010, p.814), such a two step approach can be used to test
for sample selection. The procedure can also be employed to address selection bias
(See Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 550).
But before estimating the selection model, it is essential to know the variables
that affect selection. Using a stepwise regression approach, I find that the three vari-
ables that are significant determinants of the probability of taking a loan are age,
whether the individual has an immediate family member living abroad, and the
borrowers previous loan history, i.e. whether the borrower has in the past taken a
loan from a Bank or not. Given that having a family member living abroad is found
to be irrelevant in explaining the probability of default but relevant for explaining
the likelihood of taking a loan, it is the variable used for the exclusion restrictions,
which has to be satisfied for the method to be valid. The motivation for using this
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TABLE 3.7: First Stage Regression Output: Selection Model
Reloan AME
Age 0.028*** 0.006***
(0.006) (0.001)
Fabrd -0.571*** -0.133***
(0.050) (0.013)
Bank 1.164** 0.142***
(0.530) (0.019)
_cons 0.166
(0.239)
Pseudo R2 0.147
N 513 513
*** 99% significance; ** 95% significance; *90% significance.
Note: Reported in parenthesis are the robust standard errors. Reloan is the indicator variable of
whether a participant has already received a group loan or not; thus, it is 1 for participants who have
received a group and 0 otherwise. Thus, reported under the Reloan column are the the probit estimates
of the probability of taking a loan; AME = Average Marginal Effects. Shown on the last two rows
is, respectively, the Pseudo R square for the estimated model and the number of observations in the
sample. Bank is an indicator variable of whether the participant has once taken a loan from a formal
bank, it is 1 if the participant has done so and 0 otherwise. Description of the remaining variables are
reported in table 3.3.
variable for the exclusion restriction is supported by studies on international remit-
tances and household behaviour in developing countries (like Gambia’s neighbors
Senegal). For instance, Mbaye (2015) finds that remittances has a positive impact
on the likelihood of taking a loan in Senegal, and Randazzo and Piracha (2013) did
not find evidence that international remittances increases household expenditure on
house and land including loan repayment. Hence, is possible for the family member
living abroad variable to be a determinant of the likelihood to take a loan and not
the likelihood to repay it.
Therefore, the first stage regression results of the sample selection model are re-
ported in Table 3.7. The first column of the table reports the estimate of the proba-
bility of taking a loan, and the associated AMEs are reported in the second column.
All the three variables have the expected sign on the likelihood of taking a loan.
Specifically, an additional age increases the probability of taking a loan by 0.6 per-
cent and is statistically significant. The probability of taking a loan is 13 percent
lower for borrowers with a family member living abroad than borrowers without
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TABLE 3.8: Second Stage Regression: Main Model
Dependent Variable: Individual Default
Logit Heckit
ExTraa1 -0.054*** -0.111***
(0.044) (0.027)
AgReaa1 -0.228** -0.191***
(0.081) (0.040)
ConScia1 0.004 -0.030
(0.082) (0.042)
NeuTisa1 -0.173** -0.160***
(0.075) (0.030)
Opena1 -0.080* -0.095*
(0.044) (0.026)
Socindex -0.102*** -0.053***
(0.019) (0.011)
Gssindex -0.320*** -0.060***
(0.051) (0.015)
Educa 0.428*** 0.270***
(0.071) (0.072)
Ownbuz -0.063** -0.090**
(0.221) (0.085)
Age -0.014*** -0.010***
(0.001) (0.003)
Married 0.037 -0.068
(0.200) (0.092)
Fabrd -0.175 -0.116
(0.091) (0.116)
Grotyp (SG) 0.810** 0.455***
(0.281) (0.112)
Athrho -0.024
(5.115)
lnsigma -0.824***
(0.044)
F stats 23.36 20.53
N 419 504
*** 99% significance; ** 95% significance; *90% significance. Reported in parenthesis are the jackknife
standard error that corrects for clustering at the group level.
Note: Logit= logistic regression results from specification III of table 3.6, which is estimate on just
sub-population of participants who have once taken a group loan; Heckit = Results from the second
stage regression using the Heckman selection model; Athrho = Inverse hyperbolic tangent of ρ, which
is estimated instead of ρ to ensure that ρ is within (-1,-1). lnσ = Natural log of σ; σ2 is the variance of
the errors of the selection model and the main model. F− stats = F statistics. All the personality trait
variables are standardized.
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a family member living abroad, which is also highly significant; thus, this result
differs from what Mbaye (2015) finds for his study in Senegal. However, this ef-
fect is plausible in the sense that access to international remittance makes additional
means of finance available to an individual, hence, it can decrease the individual’s
demand for loans. As expected, having previously taking a formal loan raises the
probability of requesting for a group loan by about 14 percent and is statistically
significant. The second stage results are reported in Table 3.8. Also reported in the
table is the regression results from specification III of the logistic model (i.e. derived
from the last column of Table 3.5). As the primary goal of the exercise here is to
test for sample selection in the data, I focus the interpretation of the results on just
this. The results indicate a ρ (computed from athrho reported in Table 3.8) of about
0.017, which means that the correlation between the errors in the selection model
and the main model is 0.017, and σ (computed from lnσ in the same table) of about
0.44. Thus, λ=0.007, which implies positive selection; that is, unobserved factors that
make selection more likely also increase the likelihood of not repaying a loan. To test
whether ρ is statistically different from zero, we use a standard Wald test. The Wald
test on ρ reveals a p-value of 0.873, which implies that no evidence exist to conclude
that it is not different from zero; therefore, no selection correction is required. Fur-
thermore, the magnitude of the estimates of the coefficients in the two models do
not differ hugely from each other. Thus, estimating the default probability on just
the sub-population of participants who received their first loan does not seem to
jeopardize the findings.
3.7 Conclusion
In analyzing the performance of microcredit programs, it is intuitively apparent that
two significant factors are paramount; cognitive and non-cognitive factors of the
borrowers. However, much of the focus in the group lending literature has been on
studying the impact of cognitive traits of borrowers on their repayment behaviour.
Although there has been a surge of interest to understand how non-cognitive traits
affect the behaviour of an economic agents, not many studies exist that focus on the
impact of these traits on behaviour in credit markets; in particular, the microcredit
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markets in developing countries. This study aimed to feel this gap. Using a data
collected from an NGO group-based microcredit program targeting only women in
Gambia, I find evidence that personality traits measured from the Five-Factor model
do affect the behaviour of borrowers in joint liability lending programs. In this re-
gard, the results differ from KMR, who found no reliable evidence that these traits
affect behaviour. Therefore, the evidence suggests that adverse selection problems
in microcredit cannot be ignored; especially, in the context of credit markets in de-
veloping countries.
Among the five domains measuring personality traits of the BFI, I find evidence
that all factors, except Conscientiousness, do influence default behaviour. The evi-
dence that traits like Agreeableness significantly affect repayment behaviour in group-
based lending schemes is captivating as cooperation among members of a group,
concerning monitoring each other, is among the core factors that explain the suc-
cess of group-based lending. Thus, if microcredit providers could sort borrowers
according to these traits, they could improve the performance of their schemes. Fur-
thermore, this means incorporating tools that reveal borrowers non-cognitive traits
in microcredit programs will lead to better performance. Aside from personality
traits, I also find evidence that social capital matters for repayment behaviour. Also,
other cognitive traits such as age, business ownership, and education also matter.
The study has (undoubtedly) its limitations. The first limitation is that I do not
have a structural model from where I can infer with much certainty that the rela-
tionship between personality traits and the default behaviour is a causal one, which
also affects the external validity of the results. Therefore, any further research in this
direction could help in the better understanding of the impact of personality traits
on the behaviour of microcredit borrowers. The second limitation is that I rely on a
very restrictive assumption to argue for the independence of the personality traits
and social capital variables; specifically, I use evidence on the stability of traits from
previous research to motivate that these variables can be assumed to be exogenous
in my context. The third limitation is that the reliability indices of some of the ele-
ments of the BFI are not that high when compared to previous studies - mostly in
the psychology literature. I think this could be because I am using a brief instrument
relative to these studies; although the BFI instrument used in this study is not that
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brief when compared to many studies in economics that use the BFI. The fourth lim-
itation is that the study is based on just women borrowers as they were the targets
of the lending institution; hence, I could not look at whether gender differences in
personality traits matters for repayment behaviour. I leave these issues for future
research.
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Appendix C
Additional Tables and Figures and
BFI Questionnaire
C.1 Table
TABLE C.1: Determinant of Joining a Group
Dependent Variable: Member of Groups†
logit
NeuTisa1 0.218
(0.127)
Opena1 0.019
(0.129)
ConScia1 0.213
(0.136)
AgReaa1 -0.253
(0.149)
ExTraa1 -0.321*
(0.119)
Controls added‡ yes
Pseudo R2 0.13
LR chi2 90.44
N 500
*90% significance.
† Membership in the following three groups is considered: Religion, political, and other loan groups.
‡ The control variables included were age marital status education and ethnicity.
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C.2 Figures
FIGURE C.1: Marginal Effects of Critical Core Variables (Logit of
Model III)
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The shaded areas on the graphs are the 95% confidence bands
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FIGURE C.2: Marginal Effects - Social Capital Variables (Logit of
Model III)
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Margins plots of social capital variables from Model III(logit)
FIGURE C.3: Marginal Effects - Continous Variables (Logit of Model
III)
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C.3 Questionnaire
C.3.1 BFI Questionnaire
Extraversion
1. I see myself as someone who is a talkative
2. I am someone who is full of energy
3. I see myself as someone that generates a lot of enthusiasm
4. I am someone who tends to be quiet (R)
5. I see myself as a person with an assertive personality
6. I am someone who is outgoing and sociable
Agreeableness
7. I see myself as a person who starts quarrel with others (R)
8. I see myself as someone who has a forgiving nature
9. I am someone who is generally trusting
10. I am someone who is considerate and kind to almost everyone
11. I consider myself as someone that is sometimes rude to others (R)
12. I am someone who likes to cooperate with others
Conscientiousness
13. I see myself as someone who does a thorough job
14. I see myself as someone who can be somewhat careless (R)
15. I am a person who is a reliable worker
16. I see myself as a person who tends to be disorganized (R)
17. I am someone who tends to be lazy (R)
18. I am someone who is perseveres until the task is finished
19. I am someone who does things efficiently
20. I am someone who make plans and follows through with them
Neurotism
21. I see myself as someone depressed
22. I see myself as someone that is relaxed and handles stress well (R)
23. I see myself as a person who can be tense
24. I can be someone who is moody
25. I am someone who remains calm even intense situations (R)
Openness to Experience
26. I see myself as someone original and come with new ideas
27. I consider myself as someone who has an active imagination
28. I am a person who is inventive
29. I am someone who prefers work that is is routine (R)
30. I am someone who is sophisticated in art, music, or literature
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C.3.2 Bonding Social Capital Questionnaire
For the following 5 questions please describe to what extent does each of the statements apply to you.
Note that a one means it does not apply to you and 5 means it very strongly apply to you.
1. I live in a close-knit neigborhood
− 1 (1)
− 2 (2)
− 3 (3)
− 4 (4)
− 5 (5)
2. People in my neighbourhood are generally willing to help their neighbours
− 1 (1)
− 2 (2)
− 3 (3)
− 4 (4)
− 5 (5)
3. In my neighbourhood, people don’t generally like each other
− 1 (1)
− 2 (2)
− 3 (3)
− 4 (4)
− 5 (5)
4. People in my neighbourhood don’t share the same value
− 1 (1)
− 2 (2)
− 3 (3)
− 4 (4)
− 5 (5)
5. People in my Neighborhood can be trusted
− 1 (1)
− 2 (2)
− 3 (3)
− 4 (4)
− 5 (5)
C.3.3 Perception on Trust Questionnaire
1. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too
careful in dealing with people?
− Most can be trusted
− Can’t be too careful
2. Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would
they try to be fair?
− Would take advantage of you
− Would try to be fair
3. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just
looking out for themselves?
− Try to be helpful
− Just look out for themselves
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